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ARTICLE




Individuals struggling to move from welfare to work face numerous obsta-
cles. This Article addresses one of those obstacles: lack of transportation.
Without reliable transportation, many welfare recipients are unable to find and
maintain jobs located out of the reach of traditional forms of public transpor-
tationL Professor Garnett argues that lawmakers should remove restrictions on
jitney services, allowing entrepreneurs to provide low-cost transportation to
their communities. This reform would not only help people get to work. but it
could also provide jobs for low-income people.
[Angela Jackson] gets up at 6 a.m. and is out the door with her
two children and heading to day care by 6:30. By 6:50, she's
waiting for the No. 9 Metro bus in front of the Wal-Mart on
Route 1. It takes her to Old Town Alexandria, where she...
wait[s] for another bus. It winds through Alexandria and eventu-
ally drops her near the Burlington Coat Factory in Baileys Cross-
roads, where she is paid $6.50 an hour as a clerk. Distance: about
11 miles. Time from home to work: two hours plus.I
If Laura Garcia had a car, it would take half an hour to get from
her live-in housekeeping job ... to a second domestic job ....
Without one, she rides a train, a bus and then another train,
spending four hours and $30 for a round trip. If Luis Alvarez
had a car, he would drive home... after working a double shift
here, tending a cash register by day at Burger King and another
by night at a Friendly's ice cream parlor. Instead, he must pay
* Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. J.D., Yale Law School. 1995:
B.A., Stanford University, 1992. I thank Bob Ellickson, Richard Garnett, John Nagle.
George Priest, and Peter Schuck for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this Arti-
cle. I am also grateful for the financial support of the Program for Studies in Capitalism.
Yale Law School, which made this project possible. Finally, I am indebted to Hector Rick-
etts of Queens Van Plan and Vincent Cummins of Brooklyn Van Line for introducing me to
the world of the "dollar vans" and teaching me more about the need for quality commu-
nity-based transportation than any academic study ever could. Notre Dame research li-
brarian Patti Ogden and law students Mary Clark, Christopher Keegan. and Richard
Weicher provided valuable research assistance. Mistakes are my own.
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$14 for a cab, since Westchester County's Bee-Line bus system
has no late service on the No. 19 line.2
Four years ago, Congress enacted landmark legislation overhauling
the federal welfare system. Congress required welfare recipients to ob-
tain employment within two years and prohibited states from using fed-
eral welfare funds to assist adults for more than five years during their
lifetimes.3 Opponents, including many respected policy experts, warned
that these provisions would wreak havoc on hundreds of thousands of
poor families with young children.4 The currently booming economy so
far has been able to absorb individuals leaving the welfare rolls, and
early results of the new program have substantially exceeded expecta-
tions.5 This is not to say that the transition to the new regime has been
2Jane Gross, Poor Without Cars Find Trek to Work Can Be a Job, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
1997, at Al.
3 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2112-61 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619
(2000)), eliminated the 60-year-old federal welfare entitlement program, Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, and replaced it with a new program, Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families("TANF"). TANF gives states a great deal of leeway in implementing fed-
eral welfare policy. Federal welfare funds are now distributed to states in the form of lump-
sum "block grants," which states are free to spend toward achieving the broad goals estab-
lished by Congress, subject to a few limitations, including work requirements and time
limits. Id. § 103.
4 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. 25,130 (1995) (statement of Sen. Moynihan (D-N.Y.)) ("If
this administration wishes to go down in history as one that abandoned, eagerly aban-
doned, the national commitment to dependent children, so be it. I would not want to be
associated with such an enterprise, and I shall not be."); Mary Jo Bane, Editorial, Stand By
for Casualties, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1996, § 4, at 13; Editorial, A Children's Veto, WASH.
POST, July 25, 1996, at A28; E.J. Dionne, Jr., Editorial, In the Wake of a Bogus Bill, WASH.
POST, Aug. 5, 1996, at A19; Daniel P. Moynihan, Editorial, When Principle Is at Issue,
WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1996, at C7; Merri Rosenberg, Overhaul of Welfare Prompts Uncer-
tainties, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, § 13 (Westchester Weekly), at 8; Isabel Sawhill &
Sheila Zedlewski, Editorial, A Million More Poor Children: Even if more of their mothers
are working, WASH. POST, July 26, 1996, at A27.
5 See, e.g., Carey Goldberg, Most Get Work After Welfare, Studies Suggest, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 1999, at Al; Judith Havemann, Tough Steps Credited for Welfare Dip: Heritage
Foundation Study Sees Economy Having Little Impact on Caseloads, WASH. POST, May 10,
1999, at A2; Nancy L. Johnson, Editorial, The Results Are In: Welfare Reform Works,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1999, at A18; Michael Kelly, Editorial, Assessing Welfare Reform,
WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1999, at A21; Carol Kleiman, Firms Share Secret of Work Programs,
CHI. TRiB., Aug. 22, 1999, § 6, at 1; Gretchen Odegard, Letter, Welfare Reform a Success,
WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2000, at A18. But see Christina Duff, Why a Welfare "Success Story"
May Go Back on the Dole, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1999, at A20; Peter Edelman, Clinton's
Cosmetic Poverty Tour, N.Y. TInMES, July 8, 1999, at A27; Peter Edelman, Letter, Who Is
Worrying About the Children?, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1999, at A18; George Melloan,
Editorial, "Save the Problem!" Is the Battle Cry of Bureaucrats, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31,
1999, at A23; Shailagh Murray, Drop in Food-Stamp Rolls Is Mysterious and Worrisome,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1999, at A20; Hanna Rosin & John F. Harris, Welfare Reform Is on a
Roll; Working Poor Still Struggle, Study Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1999, at Al; Donna St.
George, Aid Cuts Make It Hard for Some Going From Welfare to Work, WASH. POST, Feb.
25, 1999, at B5; Kathy Sawyer, Poorest Families Are Losing Ground; Female-Headed
Households' Gains Erode as Welfare Reform Starts, Study Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 22,
1999, at A7.
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entirely smooth or that the current welfare reform "honeymoon" will
continue indefinitely.6 Even in this robust economy, individuals strug-
gling in good faith to move from welfare to work consistently run up
against a number of roadblocks. This article addresses one such road-
block: the fact that welfare recipients often lack reliable transportation to
and from work.
7
Due in large part to the suburbanization of the American economy,
inadequate transportation drastically limits the job prospects of low-
income individuals, especially those who live in inner-city neighbor-
hoods." Since Congress enacted welfare reform legislation, federal, state,
6 See, e.g., SARAH BRAUNER & PAMELA LOPREST, WHERE ARE THEY Now: WHAT
STATE'S STUDIES OF PEOPLE WHO LEFT VELFARE TELL Us (Urb. Inst., New federalism:
Issues and Options for States, No. A-32, 1999) (arguing that the available data offer an
unclear picture of welfare reform); CENTER ON URB. & METRO. POLICY, BROOKINGS INST..
THE STATE OF WELFARE CASELOADS IN AMERICA'S CITIES 1 (1999) (finding that some
urban counties have experienced increases in welfare caseloads disproportionate to those in
non-urban counties); see also Raymond Hernandez, Most Dropped From Welfare Don't Get
Jobs, N.Y. Thms, Mar. 23, 1998, at Al; Editorial, Less PoverM Sharper Pain, WASH. POST.
Dec. 26, 1999, at B6; Pamela Loprest, Long Ride From Welfare to Work, WASH. POST, Aug.
30, 1999, at A19; Sam Mistrano, Welfare Clock Itil Run Out Before Job Supply Catches
Up, L.A. Thms, July 16, 1999, at A15; Study Says Welfare Changes Made the Poorest
Worse Off, N.Y. Tinms, Aug. 23, 1999, at A13; Michael M. Veinstein, Economic Scene:
When Work Is Not Enough; Without Training, Success of Welfare Overhaul May Falter,
N.Y. Toms, Aug. 26, 1999, at Cl; Editorial, Welfare Happy Talk, WASH. POST. Aug. 25,
1999, at A16.
7 See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE REFORM: TRANSPORTA-
TION'S ROLE IN MOVING FROM WELFARE TO WORK (1998) [hereinafter WELFARE TO
WORK] (discussing the need for additional transportation to link welfare recipients and
jobs); ANNALYNN LACOMBE, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., WELFARE REFORM AND ACCESS TO
JOBS IN BOSTON 2 (1998) [hereinafter JOBS IN BOSTON] (discussing transportation impedi-
ments faced by welfare recipients in Boston); Claudia Coulton et al., Housing, Transpor-
tation, and Access to Suburban Jobs by Welfare Recipients in the Cleveland Area, in THE
HomE FRONT: IMPLICATIONS OF WELFARE REFORM FOR HOUSING POLICY 123 (Sandra J.
Newman ed., 1999) [hereinafter CLEVELAND STUDY] (discussing transportation short-
comings in Cleveland). For accounts of this problem in the popular press, see Eric Bailey,
From Welfare Lines to Commuting Crush: Many Reentering Work Force Live Far From
Jobs; Experts Fear Transit Woes May Slow Reform, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1997, at Al; Carla
Crowder, Welfare Recipients Hit Bumps on Road to lork: Transportation Problems Pres-
ent an Extra Challenge as People Begin New Jobs, DENVER ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Feb. 2.
1998, at 5A; David Goldberg, A Long Road to Self-Sufficiency: As Welfare Recipients Find
Work, Many Stumble on a Simple Obstacle-Transportation To And From The Job, AT-
LANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 6, 1997, at E8; Jane Gross, Poor ithout Cars Find Trek to Work
Can Be a Job, N.Y. TmEs, Nov. 18, 1997, at Al; Evan Halper, Public-Transportation
Drawbacks Hurt Welfare-to-Work Transitions, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 4, 1999, at B3; Pat
Kossan, On Welfare Road I1thout Wheels: Recipients Must Get to Jobs or Lose Benefits.
ARiz. REPUBLIC, Feb. 8, 1998, at Al; Michael K. McIntyre & James F. Sweeney, The
Workout Before Work: Without a Car, People Who Live in the City and Work in the Suburbs
Face an Arduous Commute; Others Have No Way to Get There at All, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), July 27, 1997, at IA; Alice Reid, For Many New Hires, Getting There is Half
the Battle, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1996, at B1.
8 See infra notes 16-41 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the effects of sub-
urbanization on the job prospects of inner-city residents, see generally Michael H. Schill,
Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 Cm-KENT L. REV. 795, 798-808 (1991) (dis-
cussing the "spatial mismatch" hypothesis as a cause of concentration of poverty in the
United States); Q. Shen, Location Characteristics of Inner-City Neighborhoods and Em-
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and local officials have implemented a wide range of programs designed
to alleviate the long-standing and seemingly intractable problems caused
by inadequate transportation.9 They have, however, overlooked one im-
portant alternative: amending the laws that prohibit low-income "boot-
straps capitalists" from providing low-cost, private, commuter van-or
"jitney"-service to fill in the gaps inevitably left by even the best public
transportation system. The prohibitions on such services make little sense
in this era of welfare reform, especially because the experiences of two
American cities (Miami and New York), where such services operate in
the informal economy, demonstrate that jitneys could serve the dual pur-
poses of taking people to work and putting people to work.'0
Part I of this Article explains why adequate transportation consti-
tutes a necessary component of any welfare reform effort. Part II summa-
rizes current efforts to augment transportation alternatives available to
the poor. Part III sets forth evidence, both historical and current, that pri-
vate jitney services operated by low-income entrepreneurs could fill the
transportation gaps that inhibit welfare reform efforts. The discussion
concentrates on evidence from New York City and Miami, where such
services have proven invaluable to poor residents. Part IV outlines how
the law currently precludes such services. The Article concludes with
Part V's proposal for legislative reforms that would harness the potential
of willing entrepreneurs while at the same time addressing the legitimate
health and safety concerns raised by lawmakers.
I. WELFARE AND TRANSPORTATION: THE EVIDENCE
Social scientists and policymakers have long known that inadequate
transportation contributes significantly to the economic isolation that
plagues America's inner cities. In the late 1960s, for example, California
Governor Edmund G. Brown established the "McCone Commission" to
investigate the root causes of the civil unrest that culminated in the Watts
riots in Los Angeles." One of the commission's major findings concerned
the transportation problems of Watts residents:
ployment Accessibility of Low-Wage Workers, 25 ENV'T & PLANNING B: PLANNING AND
DESIGN 345, 353-54 (1997). But cf Brian D. Taylor & Paul M. Ong, Spatial Mismatch or
Automobile Mismatch? An Examination of Race, Residence, and Commuting in US Metro-
politan Areas, 32 URB. STUD. 1453, 1454 (1995) (discussing the link between job access
and inadequate transportation).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 140-168.
" See infra notes 202-281 and accompanying text. Throughout this Article, I use the
term "informal economy" rather than "underground economy" or "black market" because,
as the discussion that follows will demonstrate, the activities of illegal jitneys operating in
Miami and New York are so highly visible that they can hardly be considered "under-
ground" in any true sense of the term. See Richard A. Epstein, The Moral and Practical
Dilemmas of an Underground Economy, 103 YALE L.J. 2157, 2164 (1994).
11 GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, VIOLENCE IN THE CITY-AN END OR A
BEGINNING? 65 (1965).
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Our investigation has brought into clear focus the fact that the
inadequate and costly public transportation currently existing
throughout the Los Angeles area seriously restricts the residents
of the disadvantaged areas such as south central Los Angeles.
This lack of adequate transportation handicaps them in seeking
and holding jobs, attending schools, shopping, and in fulfilling
other needs. It has had a major influence in creating a sense of
isolation, with its resultant frustrations, among the residents of
south central Los Angeles. 2
These concerns were echoed several years later in the final report of the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, or Kerner Commis-
sion, which was created by President Lyndon Johnson in response to
widespread urban rioting. President Johnson directed the Kemer Com-
mission to answer three basic questions: (1) "What happened?" (2) "Why
did it happen?" and (3) "What can be done to prevent it from happening
again?"13 In answering the final question, the commission blamed the
economic isolation of the inner cities, concluding that "[p]roviding em-
ployment for the swelling Negro ghetto population will require society to
link these potential workers more closely with job locations.""' The commis-
sion suggested that one way to accomplish this goal is "by creating better
transportation between ghetto neighborhoods and new job locations" ' 5
A. The "Spatial Mismatch" Hypothesis
As the Kerner Commission's recommendation suggests, the chronic
poverty and resulting welfare dependency that plague many inner-city
neighborhoods can be explained in part by changes in the American
economy. During the past forty years, jobs have disappeared from
America's inner cities. The decline has been particularly precipitous in
the mass production industries that traditionally provided high-paying
jobs for individuals with little formal education.' 6 Many economists and
sociologists argue that increases in urban poverty and dwindling numbers
of well-paying "blue-collar" jobs are inextricably intertwined. 7 Manu-
12 Id.
13NAT'L ADVISORY COMI'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVI-
SORY COaMNSSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968).
14d. at 217.
Is Id.
'6 See generally Schill, supra note 8, at 798-808.
17See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WoRK DISAPPEARS 25-41 (1996).
In the twenty-year period from 1967 to 1987, for example, Philadelphia lost 64%
of its manufacturing jobs; Chicago lost 60%; New York City lost 58%; and De-
troit lost 51%. In absolute numbers, these percentages represent the loss of
160,000 jobs in Philadelphia, 326,000 in Chicago, 520,000 in New York.. . , and
108,000 in Detroit.
2001]
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facturing jobs are often supplanted (if they are replaced at all) by white-
collar jobs in service-oriented industries, 8 transforming American cities
"from centers of the production and distribution of goods to centers of
administration, finance, and information exchange."' 9 This transformation
does not bode well for many low-skilled, entry-level workers facing wel-
fare time limits and job requirements, as white-collar employers tend to
require specialized skills and higher levels of education.20
Although the disappearance of manufacturing jobs from American
cities is frequently attributed to the globalization of industry, another
major trend-suburbanization-has contributed substantially. Since
World War II, the United States has experienced a radical population
shift. While the majority of the United States population now resides in
large metropolitan areas,2' the residential population within these metro-
politan areas "has been de-concentrating since at least the First World
War."22 For example, between 1970 and 1990 there was a decrease in the
number of workers residing in central cities, and by 1990 only thirteen
percent of black workers lived in urban cores.23 Metropolitan employ-
ment has undergone a similar trend. While major metropolitan counties
continue to capture the lion's share of the nation's employment growth,24
employment within metropolitan areas has been deconcentrating.2 In the
mid-1970s, the metropolitan employment balance shifted to the suburbs,
and it has continued to disperse at a rate of approximately one percent
per year.26 "Between 1970 and 1990, the percentage of white workers
Id. at 29-30.
18 See John D. Kasarda, Industrial Restructuring and the Changing Location of Jobs,
in STATE OF THE UNION: AMERICA IN THE 1990s 239-40 (R. Farley ed., 1995).
19 PAUL JARGOWSKI, POVERTY AND PLACE 118 (1996) (quoting John D. Kasarda, Ur-
ban Industrial Transition and the Urban Underclass, 501 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
Scl. 526, 528 (1989)); see also Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy: Between New De-
velopments and Old Regulations, 103 YALE L.J. 2289, 2294 (1994) (suggesting that the
result of the "decline of mass production as the main engine of national growth and the
shift to services as the leading economic sector ... is a tendency toward increased eco-
nomic polarization").
20 See Kasarda, supra note 18, at 246-47 (showing that many major cities have experi-
enced sizable employment losses in industries with low mean levels of employee education
and gains in industries that employ better-educated workers). During the 1980s, for exam-
ple, New York City lost 135,000 jobs in industries in which workers averaged less than 12
years of education and gained almost 300,000 jobs in industries in which workers averaged
more than 13 years of education. Id.
21 Mark Alan Hughes, A Mobility Strategy for Improving Opportunity, 6 HousINa
POLICY DEBATE 271, 273-74 (1995).
2 Taylor & Ong, supra note 8, at 1454.
23 Katherine M. O'Regan & John M. Quigley, Cars for the Poor, AccEss, Spring 1998,
at 20, 20-21. Furthermore, statistics have indicated that blacks have not been making the
transition to the suburbs at the same pace as whites. In each of the 12 largest metropolitan
areas, the percentage of blacks living in the central city "was at least four times as high" as
the percentage of whites. Hughes, supra note 21, at 276.
24 Kasarda, supra note 18, at 220.
25 Taylor & Ong, supra note 8, at 1454.
26 Kasarda, supra note 18, at 235.
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with central city jobs declined from 50% to 20%, and the percentage of
black workers fell from 61% to 37 %:' By 1980, 50% of all jobs were
located in the suburbs nationwide, with even higher concentrations in the
suburbs of major metropolitan areas.' The suburbanization of employ-
ment has not been uniform; rather, it has been concentrated in those in-
dustries that traditionally employ large numbers of individuals lacking
formal education and training.29 "Today, 70% of all jobs in manufactur-
ing, retailing, and wholesaling are located in the suburbs:' z3
As American jobs have become increasingly deconcentrated, Ameri-
can poverty has become increasingly concentrated. In 1959, less than
one-third of the country's poor lived in the urban centers of major metro-
politan areas.3' Today, almost one-half of the nation's welfare recipients
do, while less than 30% of the population as a whole does.2 As of 1990,
the central cities of the twelve largest metropolitan areas were poorer
than their suburbs. 3 "In the nation's one hundred largest central cities,
nearly one in seven census tracts is at least 40% poor," with the number
of such tracts doubling since 1970Y
Many social scientists observing these dual trends--deconcentrating
employment and concentrating poverty-attribute the persistent eco-
nomic dislocation that plagues America's inner cities to the "spatial
mismatch" between low-income individuals (especially low-income mi-
nority residents) and entry-level employment opportunities." The spatial
mismatch hypothesis-first proposed by John Kain in 1964--has
27 O'Regan & Quigley, supra note 23, at 20.
28 Harry J. Holzer, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: What Has the Evidence Shown?,
28 URn. STUD. 105, 107 (1991).
2 Kasarda, supra note 18, at 246. These industries are more likely to locate in the sub-
urbs if there is readily available land and accessibility to major highways. Holzer, supra
note 28, at 106; see also FARRELL BLOCH, ANTIDISCRIMNATION LAw AND MINORITY Et-
PLOYMENT: RECRUITMENT PRACTICES AND REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS 124 (1994) (argu-
ing that new businesses "shun urban locations" because of high crime rates and because
they want to "avoid buying land from several different owners, paying high demolition
costs for old buildings, and arranging parking for employees and customers").
30 JOBS IN BOSTON, supra note 7, at 3.
3 1 WILSON, supra note 17, at 11.
32 
JOBS N BOSTON, supra note 7, at 3.
33 See Hughes, supra note 21, at 279 (indicating that in Milwaukee, Chicago, Detroit,
and Philadelphia, cities were four times poorer, in Nashington/Baltimore, New York. St.
Louis, and Denver, cities were three times poorer, and in Kansas City, Dallas/Fort Worth,
San Francisco/Oakland, and Los Angeles, cities were twice as poor).
34WILsoN, supra note 17, at 14. In these tracts, during a typical week in 1990 there
were only 65.5 employed persons for every 100 unemployed adults, a figure that stands in
sharp contrast to the situation in nonpoverty areas, which contained 182.3 employed per-
sons for every 100 who did not work. WILSON, supra note 17, at 19.
35 See, e.g., Schill, supra note 8, at 798-808 (discussing the "spatial mismatch" hy-
pothesis as the cause of the concentration of poverty in the United States).
36 John Kain, Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan Decentrali-
zation, 82 Q.J. ECON. 175, 197 (1968) (concluding that "the empirical findings do suggest
that postwar suburbanization of metropolitan employment may be further undermining the
position of the Negro, and that the continued high levels of Negro unemployment in a full
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spawned a wealth of empirical studies investigating the connection be-
tween job location and urban poverty. Proponents claim that the subur-
banization of entry-level jobs contributes to urban unemployment in two
ways. First, the decentralization of workers and employment has radi-
cally altered the "typical" commute. Between 1970 and 1990, the number
of non-poor workers commuting from city residences to city jobs plum-
meted.37 During the same time, the rate of "cross-commuting" between
suburban homes and suburban jobs or "reverse commuting" between
central city homes and suburban jobs increased by twenty-eight percent
among all workers, and almost doubled among black workers.38 By 1990,
the number of suburb-to-suburb commuters outnumbered suburb-to-
central-city commuters by at least a three-to-one margin,39 with the
"working poor" slightly more likely to "reverse commute" to the suburbs
than non-poor workers. 4° As commutes become longer and more expen-
sive, many low-skilled workers rationally determine that certain em-
ployment options do not make economic sense. Moreover, the remote
location of employment opportunities may impede the job search efforts
of inner-city residents.
4'
B. Spatial Mismatch or Transportation Mismatch?
While the spatial mismatch hypothesis has had enormous influence
in policy discussions, scholars have long debated the extent to which job
proximity, standing alone, affects the employment prospects of the urban
poor.42 For example, three years after the publication of Kain's article,
employment economy may be partially attributable to the rapid and adverse (for the Negro)
shifts in the location of jobs"); see also Richard Arnott, Economic Theory and the Spatial
Mismatch Hypothesis, 35 URB. STUD. 1171, 1171-72 (1998) (attributing the theory to Kain).
37 See O'Regan & Quigley, supra note 23, at 21 (noting a decline of 21 percentage
points for white workers, and 30 percentage points for black workers).
38 Id.
39 Kasarda, supra note 18, at 237. Intra-suburb commuting now represents the leading
commuting trip type, with twice as many workers commuting within the suburbs as un-
dertaking a "traditional" commute from a suburb to a central city. Craig N. Oren, Getting
Commuters Out of their Cars: What Went Wrong?, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J, 141, 168 (1998).
40 See O'Regan & Quigley, supra note 23, at 21.
41 See Schill, supra note 8, at 799; Holzer, supra note 28, at 106. See generally Harry
J. Holzer et al., Work, Search, and Travel among White and Black Youth, 35 J. URn. ECON.
320 (1994).
4 2 
See, e.g., Schill, supra note 8, at 800-04 (discussing the scholarly debate); John F.
Kain, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: Three Decades Later, 3 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE
371, 375-438 (1994) [hereinafter Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis] (providing a comprehen-
sive literature review); D.T. Elwood, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: Are Jobs Missing
in the Ghetto?, in THE BLACK YOUTH EMPLOYMENT CRISIS 147-87 (R.B. Freeman & H.J.
Holzer eds., 1986) (questioning whether job access affected youth employment rates); John
M. Fitzgerald, Local Labor Markets and Local Area Effects on Welfare Duration, 14 J.
PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 43, 51 (1995) (finding that local area characteristics are
significant for black, but not white, workers); Holzer, supra note 28, at 109 (reviewing
literature); Keith R. Ihlanfeldt & David L. Sjoquist, The Effect of Job Access on Black and
White Youth Employment: A Cross-sectional Analysis, 28 URB. STUD. 255, 255-56 (1991)
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two economists analyzing the same data rejected his conclusion, finding
that residential segregation and job location could not explain the eco-
nomic position of inner-city minorities. 43 While more recent studies gen-
erally have been supportive of the spatial mismatch theory, a number of
economists continue to dispute its validity.
45
Many of the most powerful critiques come from social scientists
who use commuting data to rebut the spatial mismatch hypothesis. These
critics observe that average commuting distances do not vary
significantly among demographic groups. To the extent that there has
been variation, relatively affluent white workers commute longer dis-
tances than do poor, inner-city minorities.4 7 One study conducted by
Brian Taylor and Paul Ong found that in both 1977 and 1985 white work-
ers commuted, on average, almost a mile further than minority workers.3
A similar pattern emerges when the commutes of high- and low-income
individuals are compared: the 1990 National Personal Transportation
Survey found that individuals earning more than $40,000 per year com-
muted, on average, over four miles further to work than individuals
earning less than $10,000. 41 If inner-city minority residents do not, in
fact, live farther from their jobs than white suburban residents, then a
disappearance of jobs from urban centers cannot, taken alone, explain the
persistently high levels of unemployment that plague America's inner
cities. These and similar studies have led scholars like Christopher
Jencks and Susan Mayer to conclude that the support for spatial mis-
match theory "is so mixed that no prudent policy analyst should rely on it
.... There is as much evidence against such claims as for them.'
' -
(reviewing literature); JARGOWSKY, supra note 19, at 124-26 (reviewing literature); John
D. Kasarda, Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass, ANNALS i. ACAD. POL &
Soc. Sci., 501, 526-47 (1989) (endorsing spatial mismatch theory); Holzer, supra note 28.
at 105 ( "ITihe 'spatial mismatch' hypothesis ... seems to be widely accepted in popular
discussions of black employment problems. However, the empirical support for the hy-
pothesis has always been quite hotly contested. Kain's original paper ... was almost im-
mediately disputed... and continues to be so to this day:').
43 P. Offner & D. Saks, A Note on John Kain s "Housing Segregation, Negro Employ-
ment, and Metropolitan Decentralization:' 85 Q.J. EcoN. 147, 150-51 (1971).
4See JARGOWSKY, supra note 19, at 124 (reviewing literature and finding emerging
consensus).
4- See Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis, supra note 42, at 375-93.
46For example, one study based upon data from the 1977 and 1983-84 Nationwide
Personal Transportation Studies compared commute distances across income, industry
group, sex, family status, metro size, place of residence, time of day, and trip purpose, and
found no significant variations. Peter Gordon et al., The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis:
Some New Evidence, 26 URB. STUD. 315, 316-22 (1989). In fact, the commute distances of
inner-city workers tended to be.slightly shorter than for suburban workers. ld.: see also
Paul Ong & Evelyn Blumenberg, Job Access. Conunute and Travel Burden among iWelfare
Recipients, 35 URB. STUD. 77, 78-86 (1998); Taylor & Ong, supra note 8, at 1453.
47 See Gordon, supra note 46, at 322; Taylor & Ong, supra note 8, at 1454. 1457.
4s Taylor & Ong, supra note 8, at 1457.49 ALAN E. PiSaRst, NATIONWIDE PERSONAL TRANSPORTATION SURVEY: TRAVEL BE-
HAVIOR ISSUES IN THE 90s 59 fig. 36 (1992).
.5 Christopher Jencks & Susan Mayer, Residential Segregation, Job Proximity. and
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Regardless of the extent to which inner-city poverty is attributable to
a spatial mismatch problem, there is near-universal agreement about the
theory's basic factual predicates-namely, that poverty, particularly
among minorities, tends to be concentrated in inner-city neighborhoods
and that suburbanization has meant the steady disappearance of entry-
level jobs from neighborhoods with the highest concentrations of poor
people." These underlying facts lend credence to the conclusion that the
availability of adequate transportation affects the job prospects of the
urban poor. Even those scholars who remain the most skeptical of a link
between job proximity and urban unemployment agree that the lack of
access to reliable and efficient transportation impedes inner-city minority
residents' job prospects. For them, it is inadequate transportation, rather
than the spatial mismatch of entry-level workers and jobs per se, that im-
pedes poor minorities' job prospects.
5 1
These scholars observe that despite having shorter average commute
distances, poor minority workers still spend significantly more time
commuting to work than do more affluent white workers.' 3 Taylor and
Ong hypothesize that this apparent paradox results from minority work-
ers' dependence upon public transportation, which is a significantly
slower way to get to work than driving a private automobileY' According
to the 1995 Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey, public transpor-
tation commutes take more than twice as long as private transportation
commutes. 55 Between 1983 and 1990, mass transit travel times increased,
Black Job Opportunities, in INNER CITY POVERTY IN AMERICA 219 (Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr.
& Michael G.H. McGeary eds., 1990).
51 See Arnott, supra note 36, at 1171-72 ("There is little dispute about the empirical
basis of the hypothesis: that there are, or at least have been, serious limitations on black
residential choice; that there has been a steady dispersal of jobs from central cities; and
that rates of employment and earnings of Afro-American workers are relatively low.").
Although studies based on data collected before 1970 showed no consistent or
convincing effects on black employment as a consequence of spatial mismatch,
the employment of inner-city blacks relative to suburban blacks has clearly dete-
riorated since then. Recent research, conducted mainly by urban and labor
economists, strongly shows that the decentralization of employment is continuing
and that employment in manufacturing, most of which is already suburbanized,
has decreased in central cities, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest.
WILSON, supra note 17, at 37
52 See Taylor & Ong, supra note 8, at 1471.
-3 See id. at 1453, 1457. A more recent study, based on administrative data of AFDC
recipients in the Los Angeles metro area, confirmed these results. Ong & Blumenberg,
supra note 46, at 82.
4 See Taylor & Ong, supra note 8, at 1459, 1460 (finding that transit commute times
ranged 63% to 94% longer than driving alone).
5
PATRICIA S. Hu & JENNIFER R. YOUNG, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., SUMMARY OF
TRAVEL TRENDS: 1995 NATIONWIDE PERSONAL TRANSPORTATION SURVEY 42 (1999). Pub-
lic transportation travels significantly slower than private automobiles. Taylor & Ong, su-
pra note 8, at 1460.
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despite the fact that the average commute distance decreased. -' It is
therefore not surprising that African American workers, who are nearly
three times more likely to use public transit than white workers, face
longer trips to workY
One recent study of the Boston metropolitan area found that low-
income workers living near the central business district actually have
higher employment access than those living in the suburbs. - The re-
searchers qualified that finding, however, noting that while most subur-
ban jobs are readily accessible by car, only a small percentage are acces-
sible by public transit. 9 They concluded:
What really matters is perhaps not location per se but the lack
of spatial mobility of a high percentage of low-wage workers to
overcome the increasing spatial separation between jobs and
residence. The great discrepancy in employment accessibility
between auto drivers and transit riders shows clearly that much
needs to be done to help low-wage workers who cannot afford a
motor vehicle.60
Not surprisingly, welfare recipients are much less likely than
wealthier individuals to own or have access to an automobile. 6 Without
56See PtSAPsia, supra note 49, at 70-71 (finding that the commuting travel speed of
mass transit service decreased from 19.7 miles per hour to 15.2 miles per hour at the same
time that automobile commuting speed increased from 31.7 miles per hour to 34.7 miles
per hour).
57See Taylor & Ong, supra note 8, at 1459. "Ongoing metropolitan dispersion of em-
ployment has made the private automobile an indispensable employment tool ... " Id.
"The importance of the automobile in providing employment access to low-skilled, low-
waged labour [sic] can hardly be overstated" ld at 1471.
58 Shen, supra note 8, at 353.59 d. at 353-54.
6 Id. at 359. A post-welfare reform survey of unemployed, low-skilled Detroit workers
revealed large differences in the patterns of job-search behavior between those who owned
cars and those who did not. Car owners' job searches tended to cover wider geographic
areas and to yield a broader array of job opportunities. O'Regan & Quigley, supra note 23,
at 24. Access to an automobile also has affected the outcomes of a program designed to
improve employment prospects for non-custodial fathers of welfare-dependent children.
An analysis conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation concluded
that "auto ownership was an 'important prerequisite' to participation in the program, to
completion of the job-training program, and ultimately to getting jobs:' Id.
61 "Nationally, less than 6 percent of welfare families reported a car as a household as-
set in 1995." JoBs IN BOSTON, supra note 7, at 2. Underreporting undoubtedly artificially
suppressed this ownership figure "because previous welfare eligibility rules limiting the
value of assets may have led some recipients to 'hide' [car] ownership:' Id. A more accu-
rate figure is difficult to pinpoint. Kathryn Edin and Laura Lain's study of welfare mothers
in four cities (Boston, Charleston, Chicago, and San Antonio) estimated that actual rates of
ownership ranged between 8% and 45%. KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN. MAKING ENDS
MEET: HoV SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE NVELFARE AND LOW-VAGE WORK 33 (1997). A
job readiness survey conducted by the California Department of Social Services found that
35% of welfare recipients do not have a driver's license and that, even among those who
travel to work by car, only 65% own their own car. Evelyn Blumenberg, Steven Moga &
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access to an automobile, welfare recipients seeking employment gener-
ally face four choices: stay at home, walk, carpool, or rely on public
transportation. While data from the 1995 Nationwide Personal Transpor-
tation Survey indicate that the latter option is least preferred," low-
income individuals must rely on it to a greater extent than others.63
Commuting via public transportation is particularly problematic for
those workers who live in inner-city areas and work in the suburbs. Most
public transportation networks were designed decades ago to bring work-
ers who live in suburban "bedroom communities" to their city jobs each
morning and return them home in the evening. 61 These traditionally
configured systems do not mesh well with the transportation needs of
individuals struggling to go off welfare, many of whom must "reverse
commute" from inner-city residences to the suburbs, where the bulk of
entry-level jobs are now located. Rarely can conventional, fixed-route,
public transportation systems adequately serve reverse commuters. In-
deed, while the time differentials between automobile commutes and
public transit commutes are large for all types of trips, the differences are
most pronounced for those workers who commute from homes located in
central-city neighborhoods to jobs located in the suburbs.65 In 1990, for
example, black workers using public transit to travel from central-city
residences to suburban jobs averaged more than forty minutes commuting
each way; one-way commute times in Chicago, Los Angeles and New
York all exceeded fifty minutes. 6
Commutes to suburban jobs from the homes of lower-skilled work-
ers can take so long67 that at times, frustrated workers are left feeling as
Paul Ong, GETTING WELFARE RECIPIENTS TO WORK: TRANSPORTATION AND VELFARE
REFORM 9-10 (1998) (summary of conference proceedings) (on file author).
62 For example, although public transportation use is highest among African Ameri-
cans, it still accounts for only 8.1% of trips completed; walking accounts for 9.9%, and
riding in a private car for 77.8%. J. Pucher et al., Socioeconomics of Urban Travel: Evi-
dence From the 1995 NPTS, 52 TRANSP. Q. 15, 25 (1998).
63 See Z. Andrew Farkas, Reverse Commuting: Prospects for Job Accessibility and En-
ergy Conservation, 1349 TRANSP. RES. R~c. 85, 89 (1992) (discussing public transporta-
tion in Baltimore). One 1992 survey of Los Angeles County residents, for example, found
that public transportation accounted for only 4.5% of the trips taken by individuals in the
highest income quintile, but for 56.3% of the trips taken by individuals in the lowest in-
come quintile. Genevieve Giuliano & James E. Moore II, PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IN
Low-INCOME COMMUNITIES: A CASE STUDY 7 (Calif. Dep't of Transp., draft final report,
July 1999).
64 See JOBS IN BOSTON, supra note 7, at 8; Farkas, supra note 63, at 85. For a descrip-
tion of the configuration of public transit see Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters Out of
Their Cars: What Went Wrong?, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 141, 169-70 (1998), and ANTHONY
DOWNS, STUCK IN TRAFFIC 16-19 (1992).
65 See JOBS IN BOSTON, supra note 7, at 7-8; WELFARE TO VORK, supra note 32, at I-
2; Ihlanfeldt & Sjoquist, supra note 42, at 225; Holzer, supra note 28, at 106.
66 Kasarda, supra note 18, at 254; Downs, supra note 63, at 102; Farkas, supra note 63,
at 85-86.
67 See Oren, supra note 64, at 169-70; Robert Fishman, America's New City: Megolo-
polis Unbound, WILSON Q., Winter 1990, at 24, 24-45; Farkas, supra note 63, at 88.
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though they "just can't get there from here." These facts hold true even in
eastern seaboard cities with extensive transit systems. The Department of
Transportation's study of metropolitan Boston, for example, found that
the vast majority of entry-level job opportunities available to welfare re-
cipients in the Boston metropolitan area are located in suburban areas
that are either under-served or inaccessible by public transportation."
Even when public transportation reaches a suburban job, reverse
commuters frequently must transfer several times to reach their ultimate
destinations.69 These transfers increase not only commute times-some
reverse commuters must wait as long as one hour between connec-
tions 7 0-- but also the likelihood that something will go wrong along the
way, causing a delay that can have disastrous consequences. As a Wash-
ington Post article recently observed, "[w]hen buses do serve suburban
employment centers, the commutes can be long, complicated and circui-
tous, with a high chance of missed connections, which can mean prob-
lems with a boss."7
Finally, limited operating schedules of most public transportation
networks frustrate many entry-level workers. Just as most public trans-
portation systems are configured to serve workers commuting from the
suburbs into the city, the operating hours of public transportation services
are tailored to serve those passengers as well. High-volume services tend
to operate during traditional "peak" commuting hours in the morning and
early evening. 72 Individuals who work during non-standard hours face
long intervals between buses that lengthen already onerous commutes. 1
Others find that their shifts end after the final bus home has departed.7
These scheduling limitations impose a particular hardship on those
who face welfare time limits and work requirements. Low-skilled work-
ers are more likely to work during off-peak hours than the population as
a whole.75 One recent study found that working mothers with limited
education are more likely to work in industries where non-traditional
schedules are the norm-particularly in service industries, such as restau-
6 JOBS IN BOSTON, supra note 7, at 7-8. Only 32% of potential employers in the Bos-
ton area were located within a quarter of a mile of public transit; 43% were located within
half a mile, and 58% within a mile. Id.
69 See Claire E. McKnight, Transportation with Women in Mind, J. URn. TEcH., Fall
1994, at 1, 8.
70 Jean Love, Mass Transit: A Barren Promise, AcRoSS THE BOARD, July-Aug. 1992, at
42,46.
71 Reid, supra note 1.
72 See CLIFFORD WINSTON & CHAD SHIRLEY, ALTERNATE RouT,: TOWARD EFnciaEr
URBAN TRANSPORTATION 35 n.19 (1998).
73 Cf. Farkas, supra note 63, at 88.
74 See, e.g., JOBS IN BOSTON, supra note 7, at 8-9; U.S. GEN. AccouNTiNG OFncE.
WELFARE REFORM: TRANSPORTATION'S ROLE IN MOVING FROM WELFARE TO WORK 5
(1998) [hereinafter TRANSPORTATION'S ROLE].
7s See Blumenberg et al., supra note 61, at 2 (noting that "the commutes of welfare re-
cipients by public transportation are complicated by off-peak travel"); Coulton et al., supra
note 7, at 134.
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rants, health care, retail, and domestic service.76 Researchers project that
occupations with non-traditional hours will account for nearly thirty per-
cent of all new job growth through 2005, suggesting that many individu-
als moving off the welfare rolls will work non-traditional hours.,,
The interviews conducted for Wilson's 1996 study of inner-city Chi-
cago demonstrate how the logistical difficulties of public transportation
impede the job prospects of low-income individuals, at times precluding
them from seeking and accepting employment.78 One twenty-nine-year-
old South Side resident commented:
You gotta go out in the suburbs, but I can't get out there. The
bus go out there, but you don't want to catch the bus out there,
going two hours each ways. If you have to be at work at eight
that mean you have to leave for work at six, that mean you have
to get up at five to be at work at eight. Then when wintertime
come you be in trouble.7 9
Another resident explained how the bus system's limited operating
schedule precluded him from accepting a job in the suburbs:
They are most likely hiring in the suburbs. Recently, I think
about two years ago, I had a job but they say that I need some
transportation and they say that the bus out in the suburbs run at
a certain time. So I had to pass up that job because I did not
have no transport.80
Still another observed, "From what I see, you know, it's hard to find a
good job in the inner city 'cause so many people moving, you know, west
to the suburbs and out of state .... Some people turn down jobs because
they don't have no way of getting out there."'
These types of transportation problems were raised in congressional
hearings concerning welfare reform legislation. 2 Since the enactment of
76 See Harriet B. Presser & Amy G. Cox, The Work Schedules of Low-Educated Ameri-
can Women and Welfare Reform, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Apr. 1997, at 28.
77 See id. at 32.
71 See WILSON, supra note 17, at 38-40. Andrew Farkas's survey of low-income Balti-
more residents reflected the same trends: nearly 30% of the respondents indicated that
transportation difficulties would preclude them from accepting a job at any one of six ma-
jor suburban job centers. Farkas, supra note 63, at 88-89
79 WILSON, supra note 17, at 39.
80Id. at 40.
81 Id.
82 See Impact of Welfare Reform on Children and Their Families: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 54-55 (1995) (statement of
Sarah Cardwell Shuptrine, President, Southern Inst. on Children and Families) ("Lack of
transportation was also identified [in the Institute's study on welfare dependency] as a
barrier for welfare families who want to work .... [W]ithout reliable transportation, fami-
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this legislation, Congress has recognized the impact of such problems. In
1998, for example, Congress enacted the Job Access and Reverse Com-
mute Grant Program, finding that: "two-thirds of all new jobs are in the
suburbs, [but] three-quarters of welfare recipients live in rural areas or
central cities"; "even in metropolitan areas with excellent public trans-
portation, less than half of the jobs are accessible by transit"; "many
[welfare recipients] will be unable to get to jobs they could otherwise
hold"; and "increasing the transit options for low-income workers, espe-
cially those who are receiving or have recently received welfare benefits,
will increase the likelihood of those workers getting and keeping jobs:
' 3
Two post-welfare reform studies support Congress's findings. The
first, Welfare Reform and Access to Jobs in Boston, cited four factors that
prevent Boston's relatively well-developed transit system from providing
adequate access to entry-level jobs: (1) many new entry-level employ-
ment opportunities are concentrated in the outer suburbs, beyond the
reach of existing transit service; (2) other areas of intense economic
growth are served only by commuter rail, which often fails to provide
direct access to employment centers and is not economically feasible for
welfare recipients; (3) in many suburban areas, a substantial gap exists
between transit routes and expanding employment areas; (4) even when
direct access to suburban jobs is available via existing transit lines, the
commutes take too long, involve numerous transfers, or the transit sched-
ules differ from work schedules.84
The extent to which these transportation shortcomings impede wel-
fare recipients' access to jobs is staggering. A welfare recipient living in
Boston's inner city faces the following scenario: none of the potential
employers in high-growth areas for entry level-work can be reached by
public transit within thirty minutes; only 10% of all existing entry-level
jobs are reachable via public transit within sixty minutes; 33% can be
accessed within ninety minutes; and 45% cannot be reached within two
hours. These estimates represent the "best-case" scenarios.86 They fail
to consider "impediments such as inadequate hours of transit operation,
lies on welfare are much less likely to be able to become self sufficient:'); id. at 230 (pre-
pared statement of Jane L. Ross, Director, Income Security Issues, Health, Educ. and Hu-
man Servs. Div., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office) ("Many JOBS participants do not have
reliable private transportation available to get their children to the child care provider and
then the client to the JOBS component. Likewise, some communities lack the necessary
public transportation to get participants where they need to go:'); Contract Wth America-
Welfare Reform: Hearing Before the Subconun. on Human Resources of the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 104th Congress 1113 (Feb. 2. 1995) (testimony of welfare recipient
Cheri Honkala) ("Meaningful welfare reform has to recognize that without child care,
health care and transportation, low income mothers can't get and keep jobs:').
49 U.S.C. § 5309(a) (1998).
8 JoBs N BOSTON, supra note 7, at 8.
8 Id. at 8-9.
6 Id. at 9.
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infrequent or unreliable transit service, or security concerns of recipients
using isolated bus stops or transit stations during off-peak hours."87
The second study, Housing, Transportation, and Access to Suburban
Jobs by Welfare Recipients in the Cleveland Area, yielded similar re-
sults.88 While the authors concluded that "local labor markets should
eventually adjust to the increased labor supply" resulting from welfare
reform, they "questioned whether welfare recipients can effectively reach
widely disbursed employment locations. '" 89 The researchers estimated that
approximately 11,000 entry-level job openings are created each year in
the Cleveland-Akron labor market.90 Over 88% of these job openings are
expected to occur outside the boundaries of the City of Cleveland, with a
large percentage outside Cuyahoga County, in which Cleveland is lo-
cated. 91 Meanwhile, 55% of area welfare recipients lived in Cleveland,
and 72% in Cuyahoga County.' Even the most optimistic estimates of
commute times facing Cleveland recipients seeking suburban employ-
ment-calculated for rush hour when service is most frequent and trans-
fer times shortest-are discouraging. Only 929 entry-level jobs are ex-
pected to be available each year within a thirty-minute bus commute
from one Cleveland neighborhood with a high concentration of welfare
recipients. 93 "Inner-city residents can reach only 8 percent to 15 percent
of the job openings within an average length commute on public tran-
sit."94 Furthermore, these "optimistic" estimates likely are unattainable,
particularly because the firms responsible for job creation are often dis-
persed and not amenable to large-vehicle modes of transportation, forc-
ing passengers to walk long distances between jobs and transit stops.9 '
Given these constraints, the study's authors "find transportation barriers
that are difficult to overcome using traditional mass transit.
96
C. The Hardest Cases: Women and Transportation
Even these pessimistic findings may underestimate the transportation
barriers faced by individuals comprising the largest group of welfare re-
cipients-single mothers. 97 Academic studies of women's labor force
participation are characterized by one "remarkably consistent finding":
although commute distances have been increasing generally, "women
7 Id.
88 See Coulton et al., supra note 7, at 123.
89 1d. at 124.
90Id. at 132.
91 Id.





97 See JOBS IN BOSTON, supra note 7, at 2-5.
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work closer to home than do men."9 To understand whether it is possible
to structure transportation services so as to increase the probability that
welfare reform will succeed, it is therefore necessary to understand why
women's commutes are shorter than men's. Scholars have set forth a
number of possible explanations. Some argue that women's shorter
commutes are attributable to the fact that they earn lower wages, on aver-
age, than men, making long commutes economically irrational." Others
posit that women's shorter commutes are attributable to labor force char-
acteristics-women work part-time'00 and pursue different (and less pres-
tigious) occupations than men.'0' Still others argue that limitations on
mobility resulting from women's higher rates of reliance on public trans-
portation explain work-trip differences.' 2
The gender differences in commuting patterns, however, are most
frequently linked to the fact that women continue to bear the lion's share
of household responsibilities. 0 3 For example, one 1977 study found that
women with the most demanding home roles (defined by marital status
and ages of children) spent the least time traveling to work.10, Many
women, therefore, may find it impossible to fulfill all of their non-work
responsibilities and devote a significant portion of the day to commuting.
Recent empirical research provides additional support for the do-
mestic responsibility explanation. Not only do women make more trips
per day than men, 05 but women's commutes are more likely to include a
complex "trip chain" that combines work and non-work responsibili-
ties. 06 The number of non-work-related "personal business" trips, in-
cluding visits to doctors, banks, shopping centers, and day-care centers,
has risen sharply for women. 07 Variation in the number and purpose of
trips, however, does not hold across all age groups. Men and women tend
to exhibit similar travel patterns before age twenty and after age fifty t' 3
99 Susan Hanson & Ibipo Johnston, Gender Dt(ferences in Work Trip Length: Erplana-
tions and Implications, 6 URi. GEOGRAPHY 193, 193 (1985) (collecting studies).
99 See, e.g., Janice . Madden, Why Women Work Closer to Home, 18 URn. STUDIES
181, 182 (1981).
'0 See id.
101 See Hanson & Johnston, supra note 98, at 195-96 (collecting studies).
0 See id. at 197 (collecting studies).
103 See Julia A. Ericksen, An Analysis of the Journey to Work for Women. 24 Soc.
PROBs. 428, 430-31 (1977); Hanson & Johnston, supra note 98, at 197 (collecting studies);
Madden, supra note 99, at 182.
1
04 Ericksen, supra note 103, at 433.
105 See PisAsia, supra note 49, at 41 (finding that in 1990, men made 3.04 trips per
day and women made 3.13; in 1983, men and women made approximately the same num-
ber of trips per day, 2.88).
'06 MARTHA BIANCO & CATHERINE LAWsoN, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRiP-CIhAINING.
CHILDCARE, AND PERSONAL SAFETY: CRITICAL ISSUES IN %VolMEN'S TI%\VEL BEIIAOR 124
(1999) (citing JAbiEs STRATHMAN & KENNETH DUEKER, UNDERSTANDING TRIP CHAINING:
1990 NPTS SUBJECT AREA REPORT (1994)).
'°These personal business trips rose from 17% of all trips in 1983 to over 23% in
1990. PisASKi, supra note 49, at 43.
1 Id. at 42.
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The travel pattern diverges only during women's child-rearing years,
suggesting that the increase in number of trips is largely attributable to
household responsibilities. 10 Gender differences in commute patterns are
sharpest for households with children ages six to fifteen." 0 One study of
the travel patterns of single mothers in Brentwood, Tennessee, found that
ten percent of all non-work trips incorporated into morning commutes
related to childcare.'
Household responsibilities affect commuting patterns in another im-
portant way-women with young children are more likely to work during
non-traditional hours. This trend is especially pronounced for low-
income women. One recent study found that "only slightly more than
one-half (56.7 percent) of low-educated employed mothers work a stan-
dard, fixed daytime schedule during weekdays only."' 2 Researchers
found that women working non-standard hours did so to balance the
competing demands of work and family." 3 Furthermore, the probability
of working during non-standard hours increased with the number of chil-
dren in the household. 14 Women with very young children were espe-
cially likely to cite childcare concerns as the main reason for working
non-standard hours."
5
These gender differences make quality, flexible transportation im-
perative to welfare reform, especially because the low-income single
mothers that make up the bulk of current welfare caseloads take more
and longer trips than married and higher-income mothers." 6 For these
women, transportation that accommodates complex "trip chaining" is a
necessary prerequisite to entering the labor force." 7 Not surprisingly,
working women in general are becoming increasingly dependent upon
automobiles."' As Sandra Rosenbloom has observed, "working women
with children are particularly dependent on the car because it is the
109 Id.
11oSee Mohammad M. Hamed & Fred L. Mannering, Modeling Travelers' Postwork
Activity Involvement: Toward a New Methodology, 27 TRANSP. Sci. 381, 388 (1993)
(finding that men are much more likely to return directly home from work than women).
But see Hanson & Johnston, supra note 98, at 206 (statistical chart).
M' See BIANCO & LAWSON, supra note 106, at 126 (citing D.Davidson, Impact of Sub-
urban Employee Trip Chaining on Trasnportation Demand Management, 1321 TRANSP.
RES. REc. 82-89 (1991)).
112 Presser & Cox, supra note 76, at 27.
113 See id. at 28-29.
1,4 Id. at 29-30.
"I Id. As would be expected, the most cited reason given by low-skilled working women
for working non-standard hours is to satisfy the "requirement[s] of the job." Id. at 29.
116 See JoBs IN BOSTON, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing research).
'7 See BIANCO & LAWSON, supra note 106, at 125; McKnight, supra note 69, at 5.
118 The number of miles driven by women increased 76% between 1969 and 1990
(compared with a 46% increase for men during the same period). The distance driven more
than doubled among women 16 to 34 years of age. JoBs IN BOSTON, supra note 7, at 3.
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best-and perhaps only-way to balance the child care and domestic re-
sponsibilities they retain when they enter the paid labor force.""19
Commuting by automobile, however, is simply not an option for
many welfare recipients. Indeed, women as a whole continue to be much
more dependent upon public transportation than men.2 " Low-income
women without cars face the impediments confronted by all public-
transportation-reliant individuals. Unfortunately, these impediments may
prove too much of a burden, precluding many low-income, single moth-
ers from fulfilling both their domestic and work responsibilities.
The need to engage in "trip chaining'" for example, complicates the
transfer and scheduling difficulties inherent in any public transportation
commute. A transit-reliant mother must first negotiate the public trans-
portation network to drop her child off at school or the daycare center.
She may have to walk some distance between the transit stop and the
daycare center (if it can be reached at all by public transit). After seeing
her child safely off, she must, for all practical purposes, start over,
renegotiating the network from the daycare center to work.'2' These in-
termediate stops increase not only the duration and cost of a commute,
they also increase the probability of a delay occurring during one of the
intermediate transfers. Furthermore, a working mother may find that
transit schedules make it impossible for her to meet the opening and
closing hours of daycare centers. Even when a bus is scheduled to arrive
prior to closing, she may be unable to risk a delay.'2 Single mothers who
work during non-standard hours will also run headlong into the limited
operating schedules of most public transportation networks. Structuring a
commute around the sparse off-peak schedule of most public transporta-
tion networks is frustrating for all transit-reliant individuals. Single
mothers with young children, however, may find it impossible. 1
3
Safety concerns may also cause women, particularly those who work
during non-traditional hours, to shy away from public transportation.
Although research on the relative safety of public transportation is lim-
ited, several patterns emerge from the studies that have been conducted.
First, many individuals choose not to rely upon public transportation be-
cause of concerns about safety. 114 Women are more likely to be victim-
"9 SANDRA ROSENBLOOM, U.S. DEP'T oF TRASP., TRAVEL BY WOMEN: DFIOGRAPHIC
SPECIAL REPORTS 48 (1995).
12i Hanson & Johnston, supra note 98, at 197, 208.
21 See McKnight, supra note 69, at 5.
12 See id. at6.
' See Impact of Welfare Reform on Children and Their Families: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, supra note 82, at 230 (prepared statement
of Jane L. Ross).
124 See Gerald L. Ingalls et al., Public Fear of Crime and Its Role in Bits Transit Use,
1433 TRANSP. REs. REc. 201 (1994); BiANcO & LAWSON. supra note 106. at 127 (discuss-
ing a study finding that 46.8% of potential riders perceived waiting at a bus stop as unsafe,
and 44.4% expressed apprehension about transferring at a bus terminal).
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ized on public transit than men,'12 and a larger percentage of women per-
ceive risks to their safety. 2 6 Women are also more likely to respond to
this perceived threat to their personal safety by not putting themselves in
the way of danger, even if this means forgoing travel altogether. 27 Sec-
ond, public transportation customers face the greatest danger while
waiting at, and walking to and from, transit stops. 28 Due to the sporadic
nature of off-peak transit operations, working the late shift exposes
women to both of these dangers. Women who work late often must wait
for a bus at a deserted bus stop and face long, solitary walks between
their place of employment and the bus stop, and then another long walk
between the bus stop and their homes.'29 Finally, although most crimes on
public transit are committed during peak hours, the rates of occurrence
are disproportionately high during off-peak, evening hours. 30
II. CURRENT EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE "TRANSPORTATION MISMATCH"
Officials charged with implementing welfare reform are struggling
to address the transportation problems faced by welfare recipients. In a
1997 survey conducted by the United States Conference of Mayors of
their member cities, eighty-four percent of the respondents cited trans-
portation as an impediment to moving recipients into work.'3' Seventy-
five percent of the respondents further reported, however, that they have




The federal government has tackled transportation problems primar-
ily by providing financial assistance to support state and local efforts.
States are generally free to spend the $16.5 billion that the federal gov-
125 See BIANCO & LAWSON, supra note 106, at 126 (discussing study by Levine and
Wachs). But see McKnight, supra note 69, at 7.
126 In one survey of rush-hour subway riders in New York City, "26 percent of women
and 11 percent of men indicated that they were very worried about crime"; the reported
level of fear increased to 52% of women and 28% of men after 8 p.m. McKnight, supra
note 69, at 6.
1
27 See BIANCO & LAWSON, supra note 106, at 127 (discussing study by Lynch and At-
kins); McKnight, supra note 69, at 7.
'8 See McKnight, supra note 69, at 11.
129 See id.
'30 See BIANCO & LAWSON, supra note 106, at 127 (discussing study by Pearlstein and
Wachs).
1 Press Release, U.S. Conference of Mayors, Mayors' Welfare Reform Survey Finds
Problems With Job Availability, Transportation to Jobs, Child Care And Housing Needed
By Welfare Clients (Nov. 21, 1997), at http://www.usmayors.orgluscmlnews/press_ releases/
press-archive.asp?doc_id= 106.132Id.
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eminent disperses annually through the new federal welfare program,
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF"), on support services,
including transportation, so long as the expenditures target welfare re-
cipients themselves and do not supplement existing services that benefit
the general public.13 Shortly after Congress enacted the Welfare Reform
Act, it also made additional funds available to states and municipalities
for support services, such as transportation, in the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997, which created the "Welfare-to-Work" program.'3 The Welfare-
to-Work program was a response to the growing concern that "welfare
recipients who have the least skills, education, employment experience
and who live within high poverty areas may need additional assistance to
obtain lasting jobs and become self-sufficient" '35 The Act appropriates a
total of three billion dollars to augment state and local efforts to create
job opportunities for the hardest-to-employ recipients, namely, those who
have received welfare for at least thirty months, or are within twelve
months of exhausting the time limits, and those who face certain statuto-
rily defined barriers to employment.1 6 Welfare-to-Work grants may be
spent on transportation, but only to benefit the individuals targeted by the
program, and then only for transportation services for individuals partici-
pating in a Welfare-to-Work activity, such as a job-training program.'
In 1998, Congress also created the Job Access and Reverse Com-
mute Grant Program as a specific response to concerns that "many [wel-
fare recipients] will be unable to get to jobs they could otherwise hold"
because the dispersed nature of entry-level jobs makes them inaccessible
by public transportation.3 Through the program, which is administered
by the Department of Transportation, Congress authorized $150 million
per year to assist states and localities in developing transportation serv-
ices to connect welfare recipients and other low-income persons to jobs
and employment-related services. 39
Several pre-welfare reform programs also attempt to address the im-
portance of adequate transportation to welfare recipients. The Federal
Transit Administration has been funding various experimental projects
133 Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Pub. L
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A) (2000)).
134 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Star. 251 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(5)(C)(i) (2000)).
135 Welfare-to-Work (VtW) Grants, 62 Fed. Reg. 61,588 (Nov. 18, 1997) (codified at
20 C.ER. pt. 645).
136 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NVELFARE REFORM: IMPLEMENTING DOT's
ACCESS TO JOBS PROGRAi 3-4 (1998) [hereinafter AcCEss TO Joas).
137 47 U.S.C. § 603 (1994).
13149 U.S.C. § 5309(a) (1998).
139 See ACCESS TO JOBS, supra note 136, at 1, 4. As with TANF and Welfare-to-Work
funds, the Job Access program includes a cost-sharing requirement. Grant funds awarded
for a project may not exceed 50% of the project's total cost. Funds from other federal pro-
grams, however, may be expended to meet the local financial responsibility. See id. at 4.
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that tackle transportation problems. 4 The largest of these projects,
JOBLINKS-a $3.5 million project administered by the Community
Transportation Association of America-provides funds to transport re-
cipients to jobs or employment training and to evaluate which types of
transportation services are most effective in helping welfare recipients
get to work. 4' The Department of Housing and Urban Development cur-
rently administers a four-year research demonstration program called
"Bridges to Work."'42 The program, which provides employment, trans-
portation, and support services to participants in five cities, 43 responds to
the problems identified by spatial mismatch proponents. It is designed to
determine whether the coordinated provision of jobs, transportation, and
support services can overcome the geographic separation of jobs and
welfare recipients. 144 Employers hiring workers through the program re-
main cautiously optimistic. One St. Louis employer observes, "We all
have obstacles to working .... For some people, just getting to work is
the obstacle. I feel like this program helps them become hurdlers.' 1 45
Still, this employer expresses doubts; he has found in the past that em-
ployees with long commutes often quit when the distances become too
difficult to manage. 146
B. Current State and Local Efforts
Much to their credit, almost immediately after the enactment of wel-
fare reform legislation, state and local government agencies charged with
implementing the new "devolved" federal welfare program began to ex-
140
According to an FTA official, the agency is supporting welfare-to-work initiatives
by funding demonstration projects, working with state and local partners to en-
courage the development of collaborative transportation plans, providing states
and localities with technical assistance, and developing a program that would in-
crease the financial resources available for welfare initiatives.
TRANSPORTATION'S ROLE, supra note 74, at 7.
141 "As of March 1998, JOBLINKS had funded 16 projects ... in ... 12 states" and
provided smaller grants to states and local governments "to help people obtain jobs or
attend employment training." Id. at 7-8.
142 U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEv., FACT SHEET: BRIDGES TO WORK DEMON-
STRATION LINKING INNER [SIC] CITY RESIDENTS TO METROPOLITAN VIDE OPPORTUNITIES,
at http:llwww.huduser.orglpublications/povsoclbtw/fact.html (last modified Apr. 27, 2000);
Oscar Avila, Program Links Jobs, Workers, KAN. CITY STAR, Aug. 15, 1997, at Al.
143 See ACCESS TO JOBS, supra note 136, at 9.
'*4 In St. Louis, for example, Bridges to Work contracts with the Red Cross to provide
a van service from residential neighborhoods to central bus depots. There, participants take
a 40-minute bus ride to jobs arranged for them in suburban Chesterfield, Missouri. Partici-
pants initially take advantage of the service free of charge. After two months, they pay a
subsidized rate of $37 per month. A four-year $4 million federal grant picks up the re-
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plore ways to address the transportation difficulties that plague many
low-income Americans. Since that time, these agencies have taken ad-
vantage of the various federal resources (supplemented by their own
funds) to implement programs designed to help welfare recipients get to
work. 47
Many state and local governments now make public transportation
available to welfare recipients either free of charge or at reduced rates for
a limited time period.14 Some jurisdictions have begun to add new bus
routes, including routes specifically designed to address the needs of re-
verse commuters 149 or have incorporated smaller, more flexible, mini-
buses, enabling them to expand service to include lower-density routes.tro
Some social service agencies have contracted with private companies to
provide commuter ride services for welfare recipients.'5' In addition,
other agencies operate their own services tailored specifically to meet the
needs of welfare recipients.5 2 Recognizing the inherent limitations of
public transportation, a number of jurisdictions also have undertaken ef-
forts to make cars more accessible to welfare recipients.'" The boldest of
147 For a complete list of state and local programs designed to address "transportation
mismatch" problems, see COMMUNITY TRANsP. ASs'N OF AMERICA, TRANSPORTATION AND
WELFARE REFORI: STATES ON THE MOVE §§ III, IV, V [hereinafter STATES ON THE MOVE]
at http:llwww.ctaa.orglntrclatjl pubs/states-move (last visited Dec. 6. 2000)
48 This is the case in Detroit, where welfare recipients who enter the workforce are
permitted to commute to work, free of charge, on public buses for one month. Id. § IV.
New Jersey has a similar program, "Get a Job, Get a Ride,' which provides one month of
free public transportation to any recipient exiting welfare for employment. Id. Delaware's
"Get A Job*Get a Ride" program provides free public transportation for recipients during
their first 30 days of work and also provides recipients with information about transit
schedules. Id. § III. Illinois reimburses recipients for the cost of public transit passes, up to
$88 per month. Id. In Tennessee, recipients receive $5 per day to cover the cost of public
transportation (or a $5 voucher for gas if no public transportation is available). Id.
1
49 See generally FED. HwvY. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., Jon AccEss: MOVING
TOWARD A SOLUTION, at http:llwww.fhwa.dot.gov/reportsLchalleng.htm (last visited Dec.
6,2000).
m5 For example, rural Highland County, Ohio, contracts with a school district to pro-
vide transportation for welfare recipients during hours when school buses are otherwise
idle. See STATES ON THE MOVE, supra note 147, § IV. Arkansas has implemented a similar
program. See id. § III Still other innovative programs include the New Jersey Department
of Transportation's "Transit Training" program, which educates welfare recipients about
how to use the State's public transportation systems. See id. § IV. Virginia has expanded
the "training" concept even further, providing employers with a "Reality Check" program.
which explains the frustrations faced by individuals who must negotiate spotty public
transportation in order to get to work. Id.
151 See id. § IV.
5 In Detroit, for example, the agency charged with providing public transportation not
only provides computerized scheduling of transportation services--essentially acting as
welfare recipients' commuting travel agent-it further offers to transport welfare recipi-
ents, free of charge, from a bus stop to their place of employment. Id. § IV. Fairfax County,
Virginia operates its own van-pool system, which provides daily rides for about 245
working welfare recipients; the county also provides free taxi service to accommodate
recipients who work off-peak hours. Eric Lipton, Fairfax Offers Welfare Recipients Rides
to Work, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1997, at B8.
153 See STATES ON THE MOVE, supra note 147, § II.
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these programs actually provide welfare recipients with a free car.',' In
other jurisdictions, welfare recipients are given the opportunity to pur-
chase cars with low-interest or interest-free loans. 55 Many states have
taken more modest steps like increasing the welfare-eligibility asset limit
to permit recipients to purchase a car and providing recipients with mile-
age allowances or money for gas and/or repairs.156 Finally, some local
governments have begun to recruit volunteer drivers to transport recipi-
ents to and from job training programs and work.5 7
C. Policy Limitations
Each of the federal, state, and local policies discussed above has
major limitations, which virtually ensure that inadequate transportation
will continue to impede the efforts of individuals struggling to gain eco-
nomic self-sufficiency. For example, while providing public transporta-
tion for free or reduced rates decreases the cost of commuting, it does
nothing to alleviate any of the systemic problems with public transporta-
tion. Free transit passes serve no purpose if bus routes do not reach new
suburban job centers. They also fail to make women's "trip-chains" eas-
ier, shorten lengthy commutes, or eliminate the need to make multiple
transfers. Furthermore, free passes cannot help welfare recipients who
14 See generally Monica Oui Frazier, Note, License to Drive: Getting Welfare Recipi-
ents from the Cities to the Jobs, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & PoL'Y 1 (2000) (discussing
car-donation programs and advocating widespread adoption of policies matching recipients
with cars). Fairfax County, Virginia began to provide recipients with used cars after recog-
nizing that public transportation was unable to meet many recipients' transportation needs.
Alice Reid, On the Road from Welfare to Work; Pairing Clients and Cars, Fairfax Puts
Jobs Within Reach, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1999, at Al. Similarly, Nebraska will purchase a
vehicle, worth up to $2,000, for a recipient who becomes employed; the state also provides
insurance for three months as well as making an additional $500 available for taxes, li-
censing, and registration. STATES ON THE MOVE, supra note 147, § III. Columbia County,
Pennsylvania teamed up with the local United Way to spearhead a project linking welfare
recipients needing transportation to work with donated cars. Id. § IV. The State of Colo-
rado coordinates a program, "Wrecks to Rides," which encourages people to donate cars to
Goodwill. The cars are taken to high schools where students repair them for use by welfare
recipients. Id. § III. In central Massachusetts, Lutheran Social Services operates a pro-
gram-funded in part by a state grant-that pairs recipients with used, reconditioned vehi-
cles. Bob Datz, On the Road to Independence, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, July 8,
1999, at Al.
'51 Georgia's "Peach on Wheels" program works with used car dealers to enable re-
cipients to purchase salvaged or auctioned cars with no interest or low-interest loans. See
STATES ON THE MOVE, supra note 147, at § III. Tennessee's "First Wheels" project sells
donated cars to recipients without interest. Id. Ventura County, California has proposed
buying used public and private vehicle fleets and then selling them below market value to
recipients through low-interest loans. Hilary E. MacGregor, Plan Providing Low-Cost Car
Loans for Needy Gets Green Light, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1997, at BI.
116 See STATES ON THE MOVE, supra note 147, § 3.
151 See id.
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face bus service that is sporadic and unreliable or that stops operating
before the end of a late shift.1
t
The commuter van pools that several jurisdictions have established
to serve individuals making the transition from welfare to the workforce
address some of these policy limitations by tailoring services expressly to
the needs of their clientele. These services promise to provide a much
needed, immediate solution for those workers who benefit from them by
virtually eliminating the transportation impediment to work. These com-
muter van pools, however, offer only a temporary and limited solution.
Just as public transit authorities cannot hope to provide bus service to
every conceivable destination, welfare reform agencies cannot provide
individually tailored van service for every low-income worker who needs
it.
Policies that help recipients secure access to cars represent a more
permanent solution. Some of these initiatives, such as increasing the
automobile asset limit for welfare eligibility, address glaring deficiencies
in pre-welfare reform policies. Others, such as programs providing re-
cipients with donated cars, offer tremendous relief for the fortunate
beneficiaries. It is unlikely, however, that car-donation programs will
provide widespread relief. Since there are 7.3 million welfare recipi-
ents,15 9 it may not be feasible to provide all in need of transportation with
a reliable automobile.
Most of these efforts share an additional flaw-they target only wel-
fare recipients. Once the transition from welfare to work has been suc-
cessful, former recipients are no longer eligible for the service. They find
themselves back at square one with respect to transportation. Further-
more, programs that target welfare recipients provide no relief for indi-
viduals who may be barely hanging on to economic self-sufficiency. The
loss of a reliable ride to work-a broken-down car or the dissolution of a
car pool-could mean financial ruin. The policies addressed above do
nothing to avoid these catastrophes. The urban poor benefit from those
initiatives only after disaster lands them on welfare.
158 Efforts to augment current public transportation services attempt to address these
concerns. The decision of several jurisdictions to introduce new "reverse commuting" bus
routes is a particularly promising development. Public transportation authorities can ad-
dress an acute need for new service to a large employment center-a shopping mall or
industrial park, for instance. However, at least two factors-limited public resources and
the fixed-route model of public transportation-limit the effectiveness of these efforts. As
long as resources remain finite and buses are constrained to fixed routes, they can never
provide transportation to every dispersed suburban job destination. See Co.,'tuNiT"
TRAsP. Ass'N OF AmERCA, WELFARE TO WORK, at hup'//www.ctaa.orglntre/atj/pubs,4
innovativelinnov5.shtml (last visited Dec. 13, 2000).
59See Group Questions Success of Overhaul, FAcTs ON FILE WORLD NEws DIG.. Sept.
30, 1999, at 708E3.
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III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
In much of the world, especially in developing nations, low-cost jit-
neys operated by private entrepreneurs fill in transportation gaps like
those that American policymakers struggle to address. "Jitney" services
combine characteristics of bus and taxi services: like buses, jitneys pro-
vide shared-ride transportation service for unrelated passengers; like
taxis, they accept street hails and frequently deviate from their usual
routes. 1° In general, jitney service is provided in vans or minibuses and is
operated by private entrepreneurs. After studying the operation of jitneys
in six cities abroad, one scholar summarized their appeal as follows:
They charge relatively low fares and provide wide coverage
across a city, often serving poor areas that get no other service.
Their operations are flexible so they can add service at peak
times and quickly cover new neighborhoods. Their small size
and cheap labor enables them to profitably provide frequent
service in smaller neighborhoods and along narrow streets, as
well as work the main thoroughfares. With fewer passengers,
they often make fewer stops and faster time.'
61
Despite these substantial benefits, jitneys are virtually non-existent
in the United States. As a 1984 Federal Trade Commission report found,
"most [American] jurisdictions prohibit shared-ride service, including
jitney service."'
162
With few exceptions, most jurisdictions have taken a government-
directed, command-and-control approach to addressing the transportation
woes of America's inner-city poor. Policymakers have overlooked an im-
portant non-traditional solution to these transportation problems-namely,
amending the legal restrictions that preclude private entre-preneurs from
providing unsubsidized jitney services to low-income customers who
desperately need them. This legal reform could serve two important pur-
poses: historical and current experience demonstrate that jitney services
not only take people to work, they also put people to work. 63 Because
160 See Isaac K. Takyi, An Evaluation of Jitney Systems in Developing Countries, 44
TRANSP. Q. 163, 170 (1990) ("The archetypical urban jitney system consists of a constella-
tion of loosely regulated owner-operated collective vehicles following more or less fixed-
routes with some deviations as custom, traffic, and hour permit").
'61Id. at 171.
162 MARK W. FRANKENA & PAUL A. PAULTER, FED. TRADE COMM'N, AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF TAXICAB REGULATION 25 (1984).
265 1 am certainly not the first to suggest that relaxing the nearly ubiquitous restrictions
on jitney services might help remedy the transportation problems that plague the poor. See
id. at 155 (finding that prohibitions on jitney operations lack any "economic justification"
and are part of a regulatory system that "impose[s] a disproportionate burden on low in-
come people"); Glenn Garvin, Flouting the Law, Serving the Poor, REASON, June/July
1985, at 29; Sandi Rosenbloom, Taxis, Jitneys & Poverty, TRANS-ACTION, Feb. 1970, at 47;
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jitneys are essentially illegal in this country, the arguments in favor of
this path have tended to rely upon academic speculation. In the discus-
sion that follows, I attempt to draw upon more concrete evidence-both
historical and contemporary-to support the proposition that, if permit-
ted to operate, jitneys could provide a safe, flexible, and reliable ride to
work for former welfare recipients.
A. America's Historical Experience with Jitneys
Americans were not always strangers to jitney services. During a
brief period around the turn of the century, jitneys flourished in nearly
every major American city. The remarkable American jitney phenomenon
allegedly began in Los Angeles on July 1, 1914, when L.P. Draper-having
ascertained that his action was legal, because he held a chauffeur's li-
cense-picked up a passenger and transported him a short distance for a
nickel.164 The movement gained momentum rapidly, and this novel form
of transportation exploded onto the American scene. By early 1915, jit-
neys began to appear in most American cities, literally sweeping the na-
tion in a matter of months.'0 During a two-week period in Kansas City,
the number of jitneys jumped from 0 to 200 cars carrying nearly 25,000
passengers a day. Two weeks later, the number of jitney patrons reached
45,000-50,000 per day.166 At the peak of the phenomenon in 1915, more
than 60,000 jitneys were operating in the United States.' 6
The instant popularity of jitneys was largely attributable to public
dissatisfaction with the quality of service provided by urban street car
companies.168 In 1914, Americans depended almost entirely on the elec-
tric street railways for urban public transportation. 69 These monopolists
had a reputation for arrogance and poor customer service.,', From a cus-
tomer's perspective, jitneys had significant advantages over street cars,
McKnight, supra note 69, at 12 (1994) (suggesting that women's transportation problems
could be addressed by:
vans operate[d] similar. . . to a bus but... provid[ing] more personalized service.
frequently deviating from main streets to drop people directly at their [main) des-
tinations. ... In larger cities, these services could be encouraged by a change in
policy and in regulations that prohibit small, informal transportation services
from competing with publicly supported transit monopolies.).
16 See Ross D. Eckert & George NV. Hilton, The Jitneys, 15 J.L. & EcON. 293. 294-95
(1972). Although the source of the term is disputed, one possibility is that "jitney" meant
nickel-the cost of the service-in the slang of the period. See id. at 294.
16, See id. at 295.
16 Carlos A. Schwantes, The West Adapts the Automobile: Technology, Unemployment.
and the Jitney Phenomenon of 1914-1917, 16 NV. Isr. Q. 307, 308 (1985).
167 Id. at 309; see also Eckert & Hilton, supra note 164, at 295.
16See Eckert & Hilton, supra note 164, at 296.
169 See id. at 293.170Schwantes, supra note 166, at 309-10.
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including, most importantly, speed. As technological advances enabled
street railways to evolve from relatively small trolleys into longer and
heavier streetcars, companies sacrificed speed for efficiency.' 7' Bigger
cars carried more passengers, requiring more and longer stops to pick up
and discharge passengers.
72
Meanwhile, carrying just four to five passengers (usually in a Ford
Model T), jitneys were 150% to 200% faster than streetcars. 73 Large
streetcars cars ran less frequently, making their frustrated passengers ripe
for the picking by jitneys, which typically picked up passengers every
two to six minutes. 74 Furthermore, jitneys' freedom from the rails gave
them greater flexibility than the streetcars. A driver "did not customarily
choose a destination until he picked up his first passenger. He would then
post ... that passenger's destination on his windshield and pick up addi-
tional passengers en route."'175 Drivers were also known to deliver passen-
gers directly to their doors-"usually at a rate of two passengers for a
quarter," although door-to-door service was provided free of charge in
some cities'
76
In light of the public's discontent with street cars, it is not surprising
that jitneys quickly developed a loyal customer base. One jitney enthusi-
ast proclaimed the service to be a "'new phase in the old struggle be-
tween class and mass. On one side is capital, represented by the traction
interests, and on the other side are the jitney owners and their pa-
trons. '"1 77 A pro-jitney editorialist penned the following jingle:
There was a little man
Had a wooden leg;
Hadn't any money,
Didn't want to beg.
So he took four spools,
And an old tin can,
Called it jitney
And the blamed thing ran.
78
171 Id. at 311.
172 Id.
173 Eckert & Hilton, supra note 164, at 296, 301.
174 See Schwantes, supra note 166, at 311-12.
175 Eckert & Hilton, supra note 164, at 296 (citing Jitneys at San Antonio, 45 ELIC.
Ry. J. 1197 (1915)).
176 See id. The jitneys also benefited from the decentralized nature of the industry.
While jitney operators had associations in most cities, the vast majority of operators were
individuals. "Collusive organization of the industry was difficult in part because so many
operators provided service only in rush hours or on some other part-time basis. Some men
drove as jitney operators for one or two hours before or after work, or both." Id. at 297. In
some cities, a majority of jitneys probably made one or two round trips per day. See id.
77 Schwantes, supra note 166, at 311 (quoting JOHN ANDERSON MILLER, FARES
PLEASE! FROM HORSE-CARS TO STREAMLINERS 150 (1941)).
1
78 Id. (quoting Getting Rid of the Rails, INDEP., May 31, 1915, at 342).
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The enthusiastic newsman concluded, "It's bound to run. Nothing can
stop the jitney now, no corporation, no legislation. The era of extortion
and of corruption is over."'79
The jitney phenomenon was also spurred on by outside economic
forces. "By late 1914 the depression that began the previous year had
idled an estimated one million workers in the United States ....
[U]nemployment was highest in cities of the West Coast, ranging from
20% ... in Portland, to 16% in San Francisco, 13% in Seattle, and 11%
in Los Angeles." 80 Many unemployed men were eager to capitalize on
the public desire for an alternative to the streetcars, especially when op-
erating a jitney meant food on the table. During hearings on jitney regu-
lations in Kansas City, for example, several women testified that, thanks
to jitneys, their previously unemployed husbands were "'independent and
doing a good business."
' 8'
The astonishing success of jitneys did not go unnoticed by streetcar
operators. While reliable figures for streetcar losses do not exist, the in-
dustry was undoubtedly dealt a severe blow, particularly in western cities
where companies had recently invested large amounts of capital to extend
lines to new suburbs.1r 2 One journalist observed that streetcar conductors,
"looked as if they were running funeral cars, with few mourners: ' 1 The
Electric Railway Journal referred to jitneys as "a menace:' "a malignant
growth," and "this Frankenstein of transportation:'"1 In some cities,
streetcar companies were forced to field their own fleets of jitneys as a
defensive mechanism.Iu
At first, street railway companies took the position that jitneys were
uneconomical and therefore doomed.186 When the number of jitneys con-
tinued to skyrocket, streetcar executives argued that the drivers "were
being swindled into a losing proposition by big business and deceitful
179 Id
"s Id. at 313-14.
'I&d2 at 314 (quoting OREGON VOTER, May 22, 1915, at 107). Furthermore, men with
a desire to work had, for the first time in history, inexpensive motorized transportation at
their disposal. Ford introduced mass production of automobiles in 1913, and by 1916 the
price of a Model T had fallen from $550 to $360. Id. at 313. "Ford sold more than one-
third of a million Model T's in 1914 alone. The popularity of the Fords created a used car
glut that lasted until the jitney boom emptied dealers' lots:' Id. The public desire for a
mass transportation alternative meshed nicely with the advent of inexpensive, mass-
produced automobiles and the availability of a large pool of unemployed workers eager for
gainful employment. See iL at 309.
'2 See id. at 315. By late 1914, "Los Angeles Railways was losing S600 per day in
revenue, had laid off 84 motormen and conductors and withdrawn 21 cars on six lines.'
Eckert & Hilton, supra note 164, at 295.
'1 Schwantes, supra note 166, at 315 (quoting Sydney Strong, A Nickel a Ride-When
the Jitney Comes to Town, 33 SuRv. 647, 647 (1915)).
1" Eckert & Hilton, supra note 164, at 299-300.
"15 See, e.g., Schwantes, supra note 166, at 315.
1 See id. at 314.
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newspaper articles that described them as a 'gold mine"' when they were
actually a "'gold brick whose gilding will soon wear off.
'"P 87
The streetcar industry eventually struck back with a vengeance,
launching a nationwide lobbying and public relations campaign aimed at
driving jitneys out of existence. 8 Municipal governments readily en-
dorsed the industry's (irreconcilable) arguments that jitneys were
inefficient and uneconomical and that they could be put down only by
regulation.'89 The disorganized jitney operators were at a substantial dis-
advantage in the political sphere, and their late efforts at organization
were generally to no avail."9 Less than eighteen months after the first
jitney appeared on Los Angeles streets, anti-jitney ordinances were en-
acted in 125 of the 175 cities where jitneys competed with streetcars. 9'
Most of the remaining municipalities-even those with only a few jit-
neys-followed suit within a year, as did a number of state govern-
ments.192
Anti-jitney regulations took a number of forms. Where they were not
banned outright, jitney operators were forced to operate as common car-
riers, subject to franchising and licensing requirements. 93 Regulations
designed to prevent part-time operators from "poaching" rush-hour cus-
tomers forced jitneys to operate during the least profitable times of the
day. 94 Others required jitney operators to specify fixed schedules and
routes, banned them from operating on streetcar routes, or excluded them
from profitable downtown areas altogether.195 Cumulatively, all of these
restrictions had their intended effect of eliminating the jitneys' competi-
tive advantage, which was the ability to provide flexible service tailored
to individual passengers' needs. 96
In the end, the jitney phenomenon ended as quickly as it began, with
jitneys regulated out of existence.' 97 In some cities, tough ordinances
eliminated them within a matter of days. 98 Due in part to an ordinance
prohibiting them from operating in the downtown area, the number of
jitneys operating in Los Angeles fell from one thousand in 1916 to thirty-
two a year later. 99 Nationwide, the number of jitneys plummeted from an
estimated peak of 62,000 in 1915 to 5,879 three years later.2® By the
187 Id. (quoting The Jitney as a Gold Brick, ERJ, May 15, 1915, at 919).
188 See id. at 319-20.
189 See id. at 321, 322; Eckert & Hilton, supra note 164, at 304-05.
190See Schwantes, supra note 166, at 322; Eckert & Hilton, supra note 164, at 305.
'9' Eckert & Hilton, supra note 164, at 319.
191 See id.
193 See id. at 308-10.
194 Id. at 311.
1951d. at 311-13.
9 See id. at 308-15.
191 See id. at 307.
199 Id. at 321.
199Id.
mo Id. at 322.
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early 1920s, the streetcar industry's victory was complete. Jitneys had
virtually disappeared from the streets.2'1
B. Modem Jitneys in New York and Miami
Although the historical account provides important insight into the
ways in which jitneys might serve the urban poor m the case in favor of
jitneys need not stand or fall on history alone. Policymakers can also rely
on evidence that informal jitney services are, today, serving the trans-
portation needs of the urban poor in a number of American cities. As one
scholar recently observed, jitneys "occur informally, often illegally, in
many large U.S. cities, particularly those with large immigrant popula-
tions from countries where informal transportation is frequently a major
and legal part of the public transportation system "'2m Because of the legal
impediments discussed below, these services are provided outside of the
law, making it difficult to learn much about them beyond the fact that
they exist. The discussion that follows, therefore, concentrates on New
York and Miami, the two cities where informal jitneys are best estab-
lished, most visible, and have been most widely studied.
1. New York's "Dollar Vans"
Due in large part to its stringent regulatory restrictions on the for-
hire vehicle industry, New York City has always had large and vibrant
informal transportation services.? For decades, New Yorkers by the mil-
lions (particularly those who do not live in lower Manhattan) have de-
pended on illegal transportation services-or legal services that operate
in extra-legal ways-to serve their daily transportation needs. ZO These
services, which range from high-class limousine services to shabby
"gypsy cab operations' are vitally important, particularly in peripheral
neighborhoods that are under-served by public transportation and ignored
by medallion-carrying "yellow cabs " 'm Residents of these neighbor-
hoods, the majority of whom are low-income minorities, would find it
difficult to function without them.
Although jitneys have always played a role in New York's large in-
formal transportation market, they gained prominence during a series of
strikes by public transportation workers during the early 1980s.1 Seem-
201 See id. at 321-22; Schwantes, supra note 166, at 323.
2 See infra notes 286-293 and accompanying text.
20 McKnight, supra note 69, at 12.
20 See Sigurd Grava, We're Not Yellow We Go Anywhere, 42 TRANSp. Q. 349. 351
(1988).
= See id. at 350.
2 See id. at 351.
Id. at 350.
m See Howard Husock, Enterprising Van Drivers Collide with Regulation, CITY I.,
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ingly overnight, hundreds of industrious New Yorkers, primarily Carib-
bean immigrants who were accustomed to using jitneys in their native
countries, stepped forward to fill the void by providing inexpensive van
services. 2°9 By necessity, commuters were introduced to a new type of
transportation service, which many preferred to public buses. 210 Within a
short time, the vans developed a loyal customer base. When the strike
ended, transit officials found that neither the entrepreneurial van drivers,
nor their customers, had any intention of returning to the way things were
before.211
A great deal is known about the operation of these vans because they
are highly visible and provoke the wrath of public transit officials and
their allies in elective offices.2 12 They have been the subject of a number
of studies conducted by curious social scientists, industry advocates, and
opponents, as well as government officials struggling to decide how to
deal with this popular, but essentially illegal, service.213 In the discussion
that follows, I supplement this body of knowledge with my own personal
observations. Between 1996 and 1998, I represented several operators of
van services in Brooklyn and Queens who were challenging the state and
local laws that restrict their operations.2 4 Through my affiliation with
these individuals, I gained a great deal of invaluable personal knowledge
about New York's dollar-van industry.215 I was able to spend considerable
time riding in the vans, an experience that enabled me to interview pas-
sengers and drivers and observe the service first-hand.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the van industry grew despite persistent
efforts by authorities to suppress it.216 While current estimates about the
number of passengers who rely on the vans vary widely, all of them are




212 See, e.g., Willie James, Letter to the Editor, Commuter Vans Are Risky Business,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1997, at A19; Willie James, Letter to the Editor, Commuter Vans
"Steal" Riders, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1997, at A19; Jim Zarrolli, Commuter Van Wars
(NPR radio broadcast, June 2, 1998), LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR File.
213 See generally N.Y CITY DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, COMMUTER VAN SERVICE
POLICY STUDY 5-21 (1997) [hereinafter VAN STUDY] (reviewing literature and summariz-
ing study findings).
214 For information about this well-publicized effort, see generally Editorial, Driving
the Poor Out of Business, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1997, at A18; Editorial, Let the Vans Roll,
WALL ST. J., July 14, 1997, at A14; Anthony Ramirez, Judge Rejects Most of Law on
Commuter Van Licenses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1999, at B4.
215 There are three types of jitney services in New York City: "feeder vans that trans-
port residents of a neighborhood usually to and from subway stations, commuter express
vans which operate routes from the outer boroughs to Manhattan, and car services which
serve intra-borough markets." N.Y. CITY METRO. TRANSP. AUTH., VAN AND CAR SERVICE
ISSUES AFFECTING NYCTA SURFACE OPERATIONS 4 (1992) [hereinafter MTA STUDY].
This section focuses on feeder vans. Because they generally charge one dollar, id., this
Article refers to them as "dollar vans."
216 See Husock, supra note 208, at 60-64.
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substantial. The Interborough Alliance of Community Transportation, an
informal van industry association that has approximately 500 members, t 7
estimates that vans carry as many as 40,000 people per day.21 In 1992,
the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which operates
public transportation in the city, estimated that competition from van
services cost it thirty million dollars in potential revenue per year. t9
While the vast majority of van services operate without any official
authorization, a few services have limited authority to operate a "com-
muter van service.' Commuter vans may neither accept street hails nor
operate on bus routes.2' Even a casual observer of the vans in action
quickly will realize that authorized "commuter van services" routinely
defy both prohibitions. Unregulated jitney service is illegal in New York
City.=
Dollar vans operate exclusively in the outer boroughs.2 Most of the
dollar vans' customers rely on the vans as a substitute for public "feeder"
bus service that links more remote residential neighborhoods and subway
stations?24 In addition, the dollar vans fulfill a number of other transpor-
tation needs, carrying passengers to suburban shopping areas, school, and
work.
Although normally operating along informal, semi-fixed routes (fre-
quently the bus routes that the lav places off limits), dollar van service is
extremely flexible. Unlike public buses, the vans do not have established
pick-up and drop-off points. 5 Drivers accept street hails (again running
afoul of the clear prohibition against such conduct)2- 6 and are generally
217 See Aff. of Hector B. Ricketts, President, Queens Van Plan, Inc., and President, In-
terborough Alliance of Community Transportation, at 2, Ricketts v. City of New York, 688
N.Y.2d 418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. 97-102455) (on file with author).
218 See Editorial, Council on Road to Van-dalismn, N.Y. DAILY NEws. Aug. 4, 1997, at
26; Editorial, Thwarting a Van Driver, N.Y. TItEs, June 26, 1997, at A26; Zarrolli, supra
note 212.219 WTA STUDY, supra note 215, at 8.
2 See VAN STUDY, supra note 213, at 1 (explaining that that there are 361 authorized
vans in New York City); Council on Road to Van-dalism, supra note 218 (indicating that
there are "an estimated 5,000 such [van] operations-of which a mere handful have been
licensed").
221 N.Y., N.Y. ADmi. CODE §§ 19-502(p), 19-529.1(a)(2) (1999).
=See MTA STUDY, supra note 215, at 9 (explaining that "commuter van services
comply with the same regulations as feeder vans").
= See id at 5.
24 See id.
225 This became clear from my personal observations of the industry.
226 Consider the statement of an owner of one of the van services in New York City:
First, the sheer volume of passengers that we carry each day makes it impossible
for every single one of them to call ahead and arrange a ride. Second, because
mass transit is so unreliable, it would be impossible for our customers to predict
ahead of time when our services would be needed.
Aff. of Henry B. Ricketts, supra note 217, at 10.
2001]
Harvard Journal on Legislation
willing, for a nominal fee to provide door-to-door service upon request. 27
It is also not unusual for drivers to make specialized arrangements to
serve particular passengers' needs. One of my former clients, for exam-
ple, arranged to provide door-to-door service for night-shift nurses who
otherwise would have lacked safe and reliable transportation home.28 A
passenger told me that she had arranged for a van driver to pick up her
young daughter every morning and transport her to school.229 Van drivers
make similar arrangements to provide transportation for community
groups.230
In addition to their flexibility, riders use the dollar vans because they
are faster2' and make far fewer stops than public buses. 232 Also, the num-
ber of vans in circulation far exceeds available buses, and many drivers
operate late into the night, ensuring that vans arrive at frequent intervals
and that customers need not wait long for service, even during off-peak
hours.233 When asked to compare the vans to bus service, passengers
complain that the buses are slow and unreliable and assert that they can
cut their commuting time in half-saving as much as two hours each
day-by relying on vans rather than public bus service. One Queens resi-
dent explained:
My sons have to be to school early. To get there on time, they
would have to wake up an hour earlier if they took the bus. The
bus goes through its whole route; it travels all over the place.
The van takes half the time. They can jump on the van and go
straight to school. If they depended on the bus, I worry that they
wouldn't get to school on time.... My husband works in Man-
hattan .... He has to be to work at 4:30 in the afternoon. If he's
late, he can forget his job. The bus only comes every so often. In
the winter sometimes not at all.?
Another told me:
m See, e.g., VAN STUDY, supra note 213, at 8 ("Vans will often bring patrons close to
their houses."); Aff. of Hector B. Ricketts, supra note 217, at 7.
m Aff. of Arthur V. Cummins, President, Brooklyn Van Lines, Inc., and Vice Presi-
dent, Interborough Alliance of Community Transportation, at 10-11, Ricketts v. City of
New York, 688 N.Y.2d 418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. 97-102455) (on file with author).
229 Aff. of Rose-Ann Patterson, at 2, Ricketts v. City of New York, 688 N.Y2d 418
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. 97-102455) (on file with author).
230 See, e.g., Aff. of Rev. Paulette Shields, Pastor, Center of Hope Congregational
Church, at 3, Ricketts v. City of New York, 688 N.Y.2d 418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. 97-
102455) (on file with author) (discussing his church's use of vans).
231 See, e.g., VAN STUDY, supra note 213, at 8.
232 See id.
233 See Aff. of Arthur V. Cummins, supra note 228, at 11.
24Aff. of Lena Barnes, at 2, Ricketts v. City of New York, 688 N.Y.2d 418 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1999) (No. 97-102455) (on file with author).
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I use the vans because they are faster and more convenient than
the buses. The vans come every few minutes, but the buses come
only every fifteen or twenty minutes. There have been times,
when I was waiting at the bus stop, and I saw four or five vans
go by me. Still, in all that time, the bus did not arrive. Situations
like these have lead me to rely exclusively on the vans for trans-
portation.... I also take the vans because they are more flexible
than the buses. In my experience, once a van fills up with pas-
sengers, the driver does not make any more stops. Everybody is
guaranteed a seat. The bus make many stops along the road,
even after all the seats are taken. This makes my trip long and
more uncomfortable.... I save at least one hour commute time
each day by taking the vans..... Whenever I had to take the
bus, I would have to leave my house thirty minutes earlier for
work, and I would get home thirty minutes later. 5
The demand for this alternative to public transportation is particu-
larly strong in remote communities like Far Rockaway, Queens, where
residents frequently perceive that public transportation has slighted them.
As Lebert Lindsey, an elder in a Far Rockaway church, explained:
The whole community needs the vans. We are twelve miles from
Jamaica out here and we are on a peninsula .... Ours is a poor
community .... Time is important, and anything you can do to
save time puts you on the gaining side. The vans take less than
half the time of buses. I know that our church members would
get warnings and suspensions for coming late to work because
of the buses. I see a bus every now and then, but they only run
sporadically .... The bus drivers are not from our community;
they don't live with our problems .... I don't see how this
community could survive without local transportation that is as
cheap and efficient as the vans.2-5
As Lindsey's comment illustrates, the dollar van industry's success is
partially attributable to cultural factors.2-- Many van drivers and custom-
ers are Caribbean immigrants who became accustomed to relying on jit-
ney service in their homelands? 8s Van passengers are comfortable with
the van drivers because the drivers frequently live in their neighborhoods
2 Aff. of Pauline Dawkins, at 2-3, Ricketts v. City of New York, 688 N.Y.2d 418
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. 97-102455) (on file with author).
26Aff. of Lebert Lindsey, at 3-4, 5, Rickets v. City of New York, 688 N.Y.2d 418
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. 97-102455) (on file with author).
237 See VAN STUDY, supra note 213, at 8.
mS See id.
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and are thus attuned to the unique needs of their communities.239 One van
passenger described the service in the following glowing terms:
The van drivers are really courteous. Sometimes when I go to
shop, the van drivers will take my packages and put them in the
front. They'll put strollers in the front for people with children.
I have been in the vans when there has been a long line for the
van. The driver makes sure that the elderly and anyone who has
a child or is handicapped gets on the van and has a seat before
anyone else could get on the van. The van drivers really try to
make the passengers feel that the van first is theirs. They wait
for you, and I have been driven home at night. Even though it
was off the van route, the driver took me to my door.240
In contrast, van passengers frequently speak with derision of the service
provided by public buses. For example, the passenger above continued:
I have taken the bus occasionally. The bus drivers are really
crude. I have seen them snap when passengers ask them ques-
tions. Often when I have been on the bus, the driver will start to
drive before you get a seat. You lurch forward and could get
hurt. Bus drivers won't even make sure that children are sitting
before taking off. This is public transportation, but they aren't
courteous enough to make sure that children are sitting down.
241
Passengers express support for van services because they provide
jobs for many who were laid off from work and/or were unable to find
other gainful employment. As Lindsey explained,
The vans also provide jobs for people. They are owner operated.
For many drivers, .... this is their only means of making a living
.... When they were laid off or lost their jobs, they turned to
the vans. This is how they feed their family and keep their chil-
dren in school.
2 42
219 See id. ("The commuter vans are also seen as more sensitive to the needs of the lo-
cal community than the city-subsidized bus service. The vans are often operated by local
entrepreneurs and patronizing them is seen as a way of investing in the community....").
m°Aff. of Sherry Lee-Sing, at 2, Ricketts v. City of New York, 688 N.Y.2d 418 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. 97-102455) (on file with author).
241 Id. at 2-3. Another rider commented, "At night, I particularly appreciate the
flexibility and courteousness of van services .... Bus service is as different as night and
day from this level of courtesy." Aff. of Loma Neblett, at 3, Ricketts v. City of New York,
688 N.Y.2d 418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. 97-102455) (on file with author).242 Aff. of Lebert Lindsey, supra note 236, at 4-5.
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Thus, while causing service disruptions and increasing the costs of
doing business, New York City's sporadic enforcement sweeps targeting
illegal van operations have done little to curb enthusiasm for the industry.
If anything, enforcement of the laws prohibiting jitney operations con-
tributes to a sense of solidarity between van drivers and passengers.20
Lindsey continued:
As important as the vans are, I think it is a bleeding shame to
see the police harass them .... The police say the vans cannot
run along the bus route, but where are they supposed to operate?
All the major roads here are bus routes .... It is sad that it is
illegal to do something that is so vital to our community. "
Even the vans' most ardent opponents have acknowledged their ad-
vantages. For example, in 1992, the New York Metropolitan Transporta-
tion Authority ("MTA"), which operates public bus service in New York
City, commissioned a study to determine how to respond to the competi-
tive threat posed by illegal car and van services operating in the city.20
The study recommended increased enforcement efforts against the illegal
operations.20s Before reaching this conclusion, however, the MTA admit-
ted that "[fleeder vans are strong competitors with the Transit Authority's
local bus routes. They appeal to riders because they often offer more fre-
quent service, are faster, charge less, and provide a seated ride, even in
rush hour periods' 247 The MTA further acknowledged that "commuter
vans have the advantage of being more flexible than buses" 4s and that
"many van riders perceive transit as a poor alternative "'2 ' 9
243 For a general discussion of the factors motivating the phenomenon of support for
illegal entrepreneurial activities in low-income African American communities, see Regina
Austin, "An Honest Living": Street Vendors, Municipal Regulations, and the Black Public
Sphere, 103 YALE LJ. 2119 (1994).
[Flor some poor blacks, breaking the law is ... the only way to survive. Thus,
what is characterized as economic deviance in the eyes of a majority of people
may be viewed as economic resistance by a significant number of blacks ....
[M]any blacks rightly understand that the line between the legal and the illegal in
the area of economic activity is ephemeral and that the determination of the pre-
cise point at which the line is drawn is a matter of political struggle. Accordingly.
blacks need to be in the thick of the battle, fighting for their interests. That means
condoning, abetting, and sometimes even engaging in illegal activity. Blacks must
be especially vigilant with regard to the local regulation of entrepreneurial activ-
ity, because the well-being of the black public sphere hinges upon it.
Id. at 2119-20.
244 Aff. of Lebert Lindsey, supra note 236, at 5.
245 MTA STUDY, supra note 215, at 1.
246Id. at 19.
247 Id. at 7.
= Id. at 10.
29Id. at7.
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2. Miami's Jitneys
Jitney service is also well-established in Miami, Florida. Miami's
jitney industry is in many ways unique, especially because jitneys have
long been a legal component of the city's transportation market. Prior to
World War II, minority entrepreneurs began offering jitney service to
low-income neighborhoods that were under-served by the city's public
transportation system."0 These services provided "essential transporta-
tion to minority workers commuting to service jobs in downtown Miami
and Miami Beach."' 5 Prior to 1981, the City of Miami had issued oper-
ating certificates to three jitney services, all of which were required to
operate on fixed, pre-established routes, when solicited by street hails. 212
In 1983, however, concerned that jitney services were siphoning passen-
gers and revenues away from public Metrobus service, the county placed
a moratorium on the consideration of any additional applications for jit-
ney licenses pending a comprehensive policy study.? 3 The county subse-
quently enacted an ordinance that prohibited jitneys from operating on
any existing Metrobus or jitney route if the service would "result in seri-
ous negative impact on existing transit or jitney ridership."'2  The county
further prohibited the operation of jitneys in "transit core corridors"-
that is, within "'one-half mile sectors of land centered along routes
where current Metrobus service is provided every half-hour or more fre-
quently."' 2"5 Although the moratorium was subsequently lifted to permit
authorization of several new services, the county has not issued new
certificates since 19862
6
The Florida legislature passed a law in 1989 that prohibited "local
governments from regulating private passenger motor courriers engaged
in intercity transportation service." 7 Under the statute, private operators
could provide "intercity" services between various municipalities within
metropolitan Miami-Dade County without a license.258 The Miami area
was inundated with unlicensed jitney services, including "both licensed
certificate holders who expanded their operations to new unlicensed
routes, and new independent owner-operators, operating entirely without
250 See URn. MOBILITY CORP. & KPMG PEAT MARWICK, MIAMI JITNEYS 6 (Prepared




153 See id. at 8.
2id. at 9.
2 Id. (quoting Metro-Dade Transp. Admin., Jitney Policy Report, Nov. 1983).
5 Id. at 10. Taken together, these provisions "effectively precluded any further jitney
services, other than those grandfathered in under the 1981 ordinance." Id. The county did
approve six new routes in 1986, but subsequently cancelled them. Id.
157 Id. at 13.
258 Id. at 14.
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any certificates "' 59 The legislature responded by passing "a corrective
amendment in September 1990, limiting the statutory exemption to 'in-
tercounty' transportation. 260
Since that time, county officials have conducted periodic enforce-
ment sweeps, issuing citations to drivers and impounding hundreds of
vehicles.161 These enforcement efforts, however, have done little to curb
the operation of illegal jitneys.' To the contrary, unlicensed jitneys have
continued to proliferate, providing an impetus for county policymakers to
consider a compromise solution32 The competing interests have not yet
been able to reach agreement on a way to better incorporate the jitneys
into Miami's transportation network. One compromise proposal was de-
veloped by Miami's mayor, but it was defeated by a 6-1 vote of the Board
of County Commissioners."
Because the majority of jitneys in Miami-Dade County operate
without authorization, it is difficult to determine the precise scope of the
industry. Prior to 1991, Miami had issued operating certificates to twelve
jitney services. 20 In the wake of Hurricane Andrew, the county issued
twenty-one emergency certificates, all of which have since expired.21-
There are at least seven jitney services that lack any operating author-
ity.267 Due to a number of factors, including periodic enforcement sweeps
and the transient nature of many of the illegal operations, the number of
jitneys constantly changes3m A study prepared for the Federal Transit
Authority ("FTA") estimated that in 1992 there were 393 jitneys operat-
ing in metropolitan Miami.2 These jitneys carried between 43,000 and
49,000 riders per day, or between 946,000 and 1,078,000 riders per
month-numbers equivalent to "23-27 percent of the current weekday
Metrobus ridership at 183,000 and 18-20 percent of the current weekday
public transit system ridership....,,z1
The markets served by jitneys in Miami and New York are similar.
As in New York, the Miami jitneys' customer base is comprised largely
2591l
2 The legislature did "grandfather" all jitney services operating prior to January 1.
1990, but "due to an acknowledged scrivener's error, the exemption was applied only to
'intracity' transportation, with the result that Dade County regained authority to regulate
over all private transportation services:' Id. The Legislature unanimously passed a correc-
tive amendment but the governor vetoed it. Id
2
6 See id. at 15.
26 See id.
20See id. at 15, 18.
26Id at 16-18.
2 Id In discussing the three jitney services operating before 1981, the study indicates
that the services lease their permits to drivers and operators who pay a flat fee and assume
operating costs. IL at 6.
26Id at 19.
2 See id at 20.
2S Id.
2-
9 kL at 20-21.
270 ld at 24.
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of low-income workers. The FTA study found that almost 78% of jitney
riders earned less than $20,000,271 and nearly 44% earned less than
$10,000, per year.27 2 Many jitney riders are recent immigrants. Indeed,
only 46% of riders surveyed reported speaking English as their primary
language.273 Miami residents' reasons for relying on jitneys parallel those
offered in New York. Sixty-five percent of riders surveyed reported that
they chose jitneys because they were faster than Metrobus service.
27 4
Twenty-five percent cited cost.275 The Miami jitneys also arrive at more
frequent intervals than buses.276 Again paralleling New York, jitneys ap-
pear to have established a loyal customer base. A majority of jitney riders
indicated they "always ride the jitney" for their transportation needs,
while only thirty-one percent indicated they chose "whichever vehicle
arrives first." 77
The structures of the jitney markets in the two cities diverge some-
what. In New York, the dollar vans serve individuals with traditional "ra-
dial" commutes from residential neighborhoods in the outer boroughs to
jobs in downtown Manhattan.278 In Miami, on the other hand, the jitney
routes tend to reflect the more modem commuting patterns predicted by
spatial mismatch theorists. In other words, they serve workers who must
"reverse commute" from Miami to outer suburbs or "cross-commute"
between the surrounding suburban communities in Dade and Broward
counties.279 The fact that many jitney services entered the market as a
result of the statutory loophole for intercity services created in 198920
further suggests that cross-commuting is prevalent. There is also anec-
dotal evidence that jitneys take passengers to locations that public trans-
portation does not serve.
2
1'
C. Lessons Learned: The Promise of Jitneys
Both contemporary and historical evidence suggest that poor urban
dwellers could benefit substantially from jitneys. The jitneys' appearance
271 Id. at28.272 Id. at Part II: Exhibits.
273 Id.274 Id. at 28.
275 Id.
2761d. (discussing an informal study conducted by the Miami Herald in April 1991,
which found that jitneys arrived at more frequent intervals than Metrobuses).
2r Id. at 27.
211 personally observed these service characteristics, and discussed the predominant
commuting patterns with jitney riders and drivers during my representation of jitney op-
erators.
279 Broward County tackled the problem of regulating jitneys more recently. See, e.g.,
Robert McClure, Broward Sets Sights on Regulating Jitneys, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-
SENTINEL, Dec. 9, 1998, at 4B.
2 See MIAMI JITNEYS, supra note 250, at 14.
281 Alfonso Chardy, Jitneys Take Workers Where Buses Don't, MIAMI HERALD, July 20,
1998, at 10A.
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and remarkable success early in this century was a response, in large
part, to conditions similar to those that currently impede the efforts of
many poor Americans to gain economic self-sufficiency. Specifically, the
prevailing system of public transportation (the street railway) was unable
to serve adequately the transportation needs of the urban workforce.28
The street car service limitations that spurred the development of jitneys
closely parallel the problems with modem public transportation. Street
cars were cumbersome, overcrowded, and slow.2 They arrived at infre-
quent intervals, forcing passengers to wait for long periods and prolong-
ing their commutes to work.38 Furthermore, street cars were tied to fixed
routes and thus were unable to tailor their services to passengers' de-
mands.3
When jitneys appeared, they seemed to offer the perfect antidote to
each of these complaints. Jitneys were much faster than street cars be-
cause they were smaller and made fewer stops.26 The large numbers of
jitneys in circulation, especially during rush hour, ensured that passen-
gers need wait no longer than a few minutes to catch a ride to work.
Furthermore, jitney drivers could easily deviate from heavily traveled
routes to meet the demands of individual customers.2 Jitney drivers
could shape their service in many ways to fit niche markets or to comport
with their own work schedules.3 Finally, jitneys had the added benefit of
providing an income for thousands of men who otherwise would have
faced economic dislocation.?90
The very factors that attracted passengers to jitney service during the
early 1900s could also prove beneficial to welfare recipients struggling to
enter the workforce today. The relative speed of jitney service makes it
an attractive alternative to commuting long distances via public trans-
portation. If modem-day jitneys could replicate the relative time advan-
tages they enjoyed during their heyday in the early part of the century,
their availability might well tip the balance for some welfare recipients in
favor of accepting jobs in remote suburban locations. Jitneys' flexibility
might serve as the perfect antidote to the problems that make public
transportation ill-suited to serve the needs of low-skilled and low-income
inner-city residents. If jitney service could adapt to market demand today
as well as it did in 1916, we could expect entrepreneurs to create "niche"
m See supra notes 168-174 and accompanying text.
m See supra notes 168-174 and accompanying text.
2 See supra notes 168-174 and accompanying text.
28 See supra notes 168-174 and accompanying text.
2' See supra notes 173-176 and accompanying text.
28 See supra notes 173-176 and accompanying text.
2 8 See supra notes 173-176 and accompanying text.
29 See supra notes 173-176 and accompanying text. The evidence indicates that this
specialization was quite common.
290 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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services that efficiently transport workers to dispersed suburban loca-
tions.
The parallels between 1916 and today are far from perfect. Jitneys'
brief triumph occurred prior to (or at least at the cusp of) the widespread
dispersal of population and employment. 29' Passengers generally lived
and worked near central-city areas.2" As such, the geographic scope of
the jitneys' service was generally quite limited. Indeed, the jitneys' ad-
vantage over street cars was in trips of less than two and one-half miles
in length.29 3 If modern-day jitney service were merely to replicate this
earlier model, it would do little to address the main transportation needs
of the urban poor. On the other hand, if modern jitneys were to take ad-
vantage of their inherent flexibility to respond to market forces by pro-
viding reliable rides to dispersed suburban job locations, their re-
introduction could be an important component of current welfare reform
efforts.
Modern experience with illegal jitneys provides support for the latter
conclusion. The very fact that jitney services have sprung into existence
despite severe legal impediments provides powerful evidence that they
satisfy a serious need. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that the
legal prohibitions that force certain industries "underground" tend to
have a particularly detrimental effect upon traditionally marginalized
groups-minorities, women, and the very poor.2 94 As such, "underground
economies provide comparatively greater opportunities for women and
other groups traditionally subject to discrimination."2 95 The jitney serv-
ices in New York and Miami fit this pattern. Jitneys operate in the very
neighborhoods that traditionally have suffered from a lack of adequate
transportation, i.e., economically isolated minority neighborhoods in
large urban centers, and are operated by entrepreneurs from those same
communities.
296
Furthermore, the proliferation of jitneys in cities like New York and
Miami represents a response to a significant problem currently inhibiting
welfare-reform efforts: the failure of legal transportation services to meet
the demands of the urban poor.' Where they operate illegally in large
291 See supra notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
292 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
293 See Eckert & Hilton, supra note 164, at 296.
294 For an excellent discussion of the role of the informal economy in the developing
world, see generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION
IN THE THIRD WORLD (1989).
295 George L. Priest, The Ambiguous Moral Foundations of the Underground Economy,
103 YALE L.J. 2259, 2273 (1994); see also id. at 2259, 2260-62; Alejandro Portes and
J6sef Bdrdcz, The Informal Sector under Capitalism and State Socialism: A Preliminary
Comparison, Soc. JUST., Fall-Winter 1988, at 21-22 (observing that "members of dis-
criminated ethnic and racial groups tend to be overrepresented as workers in informal en-
terprises").
296 See, e.g., VAN STUDY, supra note 213, at 8.
297 See supra notes 225-249, 274-277 and accompanying text.
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numbers, jitneys have a proven track-record of serving low-income
workers. Riders report that without jitneys they would lack reliable
transportation. 298 Jitneys are faster (cutting some commute times in half)
and more reliable (arriving at more frequent intervals) than public bus
service.2 9 Jitneys are regularly available during off-peak hours of opera-
tion, when bus service is either sporadic or non-existent. As one rider
observed:
My son also uses van services on a daily basis to go to work at
the Red Lobster in Valley Stream. He works in the afternoon
and needs a dependable means of transportation. Because he
goes to work during off-peak hours, he has to wait [a] long time
for the bus to arrive. He has been late to work because he waited
so long to catch the bus. The van services, however, are readily
available all day long. I know if he takes a van, he will be on
time for work.30
The flexible nature of the service is invaluable to many customers,
particularly women concerned for their safety."' One woman explained
the value of the "door-to-door" dollar van service as follows:
Because I usually arrive home from work late at night, I am
concerned about my safety. If I take the bus, I have to walk sev-
eral blocks to get to my house. The streets in my neighborhood
are not well lit .... One of my neighbors was mugged a block
away not long ago. For an extra dollar, the van driver will take
me [ ] directly to my gate and make sure that I enter safely. I
take advantage of this door-to-door service option every night,
never fail.302
Finally, jitneys sometimes go where public buses do not, enabling their
low-income riders to maintain jobs that would otherwise be unreach-
able.30
3
29' See supra notes 225, 244 and accompanying text.
29 See, e.g., VAN STUDY, supra note 213, at 8; see also Schwantes, supra note 166, at
312.
3 0Aff. of Lorna Neblett, supra note 241, at 4.
ml See, e.g., John Tierney, Man Wth A Van, N.Y. T"IlEs. Aug. 10, 1997, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 22 ("'When I'm working late, it's very scary waiting in the dark for the bus and
then walking the three blocks home. With Vincent's van, I get home in less than half an
hour. He takes me right to the door and waits until I get inside."') (quoting Cynthia Peters.
nurse and van customer).
m Aff. of Lorna Neblett, supra note 241, at 3
3m See Chardy, supra note 281 (discussing "the lack of county buses to or from Miami
International Airport-a major employment center-after 10:30 p.m. or before 6:30 a.m.
That means workers on very late or very early shifts cannot get to work unless they have
cars or use chartered bus or van services.').
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Could these service characteristics be replicated elsewhere? In New
York and Miami, the jitneys constitute a "home-grown" industry operated
primarily by low-income entrepreneurs who tailor their services, for rea-
sons of community solidarity as well as economics, to fit the needs of
their neighbors.3" Many drivers began operating jitneys because they
perceived a need in their communities for better transportation. As such,
the jitneys tend to fill in the gaps left by public transportation-providing
the type of service that public buses cannot, or will not, provide. If per-
mitted, entrepreneurs in other cities-"bootstraps capitalists" who under-
stand their clientele's unique needs because they are from the same
neighborhood-could fill the void left by public transportation by pro-
viding jitney services.
Jitneys could go a long way toward filling the gaps left by current ef-
forts to address the transportation woes facing the urban poor. The prolif-
eration of jitneys providing inexpensive, round-the-clock, flexible, reli-
able, and speedy transportation service that extends beyond the reach of
current public transit networks would benefit thousands of low-wage
workers who currently lack a reliable ride to work. Jitney services could
respond to market demand in other cities by serving suburban job centers
that are essentially unreachable by conventional mass transit, helping
thousands of welfare recipients who face the daunting prospect of long
"reverse commutes" to low-paying entry-level jobs. While, thus far, the
jitney services that have sprung up despite legal obstacles frequently
serve immigrants accustomed to using jitneys, removing legal impedi-
ments could lead to an expansion of the services in other poor communi-
ties.
Furthermore, because entry into the jitney market requires little for-
mal training or capital investment, jitneys could also provide employment
opportunities for current welfare recipients. 5 Especially in New York,
there is ample evidence that many operators initially began operating
jitneys when they lost another job.306 Many drivers argue that jitney serv-
ices constitute an economic lifeline that enables them to stay afloat
3
G' See VAN STUDY, supra note 213, at 8; Aff. of Arthur V. Cummins, supra note 228,
at 10-11 ("Every night, I pick up several groups of nurses from their jobs late at night and
drive them home. Right now, there are twenty-six nurses who rely on my service."); Aff. of
Melvipher "Pat" Harvey, Owner, Pat Carrier and Sons, Inc., at 3, Ricketts v. City of New
York, 688 N.Y.2d 418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. 97-102455) (on file with author) ("Pat
Carrier is dedicated to helping the community thrive. We work with three or four pastors
from local churches. At their request, we often take senior citizens to the doctor or take
children on field trips.'); Aff. of Newland Nicholson, at 2, Ricketts v. City of New York,
688 N.Y.2d 418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. 97-102455) (on file with author) ("I go out of
my way for my passengers. If it's raining or snowing outside, I drop them off at their gate.
If it's dark, I drop them off at their gate. All the van drivers will do that.").
0 See infra note 374 for a discussion of the potential costs of entering the jitney mar-
ket.
106 See, e.g., Aff. of Everton Daswell, at 2, Ricketts v. City of New York, 688 N.Y.2d
418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. 97-102455) (on file with author).
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financially and avoid welfare.m In both Miami and New York, jitneys
have proven that they not only take people to work, but they also put
people to work These facts alone should lead legislators to question
whether the current legal regime has become an anachronism.
III. REGULATORY IMPEDIMENTS TO INFORMAL JITNEY SERVICES
One major obstacle stands in the way of jitney services: jitneys are,
for all intents and purposes, illegal in most states in this country.) 3 Jit-
neys never recovered from early legislative setbacks. Even today, a com-
plex maze of federal, state, and local regulations work together to keep
them off the road and out-of-bounds for customers seeking a reliable ride
to work.309 As with any legal issue that is primarily local, the laws regu-
lating private transportation services are far from uniform.310 In this case,
the task of describing diverse laws is made more difficult by the fact that
many jurisdictions prefer the "death by a thousand cuts" form of regula-
tion to outright bans on jitney services. 31 To understand how the law
might be changed to unleash jitney services' potential-and to enlist low-
income entrepreneurs like those operating in New York and Miami in
welfare reform efforts-it is necessary to understand how the law makes
many Americans strangers to jitney services.
A. Federal Impedintents
The regulation of local transportation services has traditionally been,
and continues to be, the province of state and local governments. Al-
though no federal law actually prohibits entrepreneurial efforts to operate
jitney services in the United States, the federal government has not re-
3 See, e.g., id. ("If I could not drive a van for a living, I don't know how I would sup-
port my family."); Aff. of Dennis Harry, President, Rockaway Commuter Line, Inc., at 5,
Ricketts v. City of New York, 688 N.Y.2d 418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. 97-102455) (on
file with author) ("Most [of his drivers] would never seek public aid; they would rather
work than seek welfare."); Aff. of Melvipher "Pat" Harvey, supra note 304, at 5 ("One of
my drivers was earning $25 each day. Now with the income he's earned driving, he was
able to buy a home for his wife and children. That makes me feel good about my company.
I have helped a man achieve the American Dream:'); Aff. of Tivy Russell, at 2, Ricketts v.
City of New York, 688 N.Y.2d 418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. 97-102455) (on file with
author) ("When I worked in construction, it paid well. However, in construction, some-
times you work and sometimes you don't .... I started driving vans because I needed
something more dependable to support my family:'); see also Austin, supra note 243, at
2123 (discussing the importance of another "underground" industry-street vending-in
reducing black unemployment).
313 See FRANKENA & PAULTER, supra note 162, at 25; DANIEL B. KLEIN ET AL, CURB
RIGHTS: A FOUNDATiON FOR FREE ENTERPRISE IN URBAN TRANSIT 107-10 (1997) (dis-
cussing how property rights could resolve the problems of free market transit that have
plagued the few metropolitan areas that do allow jitneys).
309 See infra notes 312-366 and accompanying text.310 See infra notes 323-325 and accompanying text.
311 See infra notes 336-366 and accompanying text.
2001]
Harvard Journal on Legislation
mained purely agnostic about state and local transportation policy. To the
contrary, beginning with the 1964 Urban Mass Transit Act, Congress in-
dicated its preference for centralized public transportation systems.3',
Since that time, Congress has provided hundreds of billions of dollars in
subsidies for mass transportation projects.
31 3
As is often the case, these federal subsidies come with strings at-
tached. Congress requires recipients of federal transportation funds to
adopt generous protection policies for unionized public transit workers.
Specifically, section 13(c) of the Mass Transit Act requires entities re-
ceiving such funds to shield transit workers against the negative impacts
of competition. 314 The Department of Labor has determined that compli-
ance with section 13(c) requires entities receiving federal transportation
funds to enter into a collective bargaining agreement, the "Model Section
13(c) Agreement for UMTA Operating Assistance," with transportation
employees represented by unions.315 Under the terms of the Model
Agreement, when a recipient of federal transportation funds makes any
change that places any employee "in a worse position with respect to
compensation," it must pay him a "displacement allowance" equal to his
previous salary and benefits. 31 6 This entitlement does not terminate until
the employee secures employment with compensation equal to or ex-
ceeding his previous employment or six years following the displacement
or dismissal, whichever comes first.317 Proponents of competition claim
that, as interpreted, section 13(c) provides unions with a powerful politi-
cal weapon to prevent any effort to introduce privatized mass transporta-
tion services or to subject public transportation systems to competition.
3 18
While it is not clear whether legislative changes that allow private serv-
ices such as jitneys to operate would trigger the statutory guarantees,
budget-conscious policymakers have to be on guard against the possibil-
312 Pub. L. 88-365, 78 Stat. 302 (1964) (originally codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1621
(1988), recodified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5330, 5332-5338, 10531 (1994)) (also known as
the Federal Transit Act).
313 John Walters, Bus-jacking the Revolution, 75 POL'y REV., Jan./Feb. 1996, at 8 (re-
porting that since 1964, the "government has showered mass transit projects with $200
billion in subsidies"); see also Cy Malloy, Transportation Issues Remain on Track, CON-
CRETE PRODUCTS, Sept. 20, 1998, at 57 (noting that Congress appropriated an additional
$42 billion for public transportation projects in the 1998 Transportation Equity Assistance
Act for the Twenty-First Century).
314Pub. L. 88-365, § 13(c), 78 Stat. 302 (1964) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5333 (1994));
see also Walters, supra note 313 (noting that section 13(c) of the 1964 Federal Transit Act
"stipulates that any public transit worker 'negatively impacted' by competition may receive
six years of salary and benefits").
315 MODEL SECTION 13(c) AGREEMENT FOR UMTA OPERATING AssISTANCE (on file
with author). The American Public Transit Association and labor organizations represent-
ing public transportation workers agree that the terms of the agreement represent "fair and
equitable" labor conditions. Id.
316 Id. § 7(b).
317 Id. §§ 6(a), 7(a).
311 Cf Walters, supra note 313.
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ity. For example, section 13(c) forced Indianapolis Mayor Stephen Gold-
smith to scrap his plans to permit independent, low-income entrepreneurs
to operate van services in competition with city buses.3"9
B. State and Local Impediments
Most of the regulations that directly restrict the operation of private
passenger transportation services, including jitney services, are found in
state statutes and local ordinances.32 Many of these restrictions represent
the vestiges of outdated anti-jitney legislation. For example, in 1994, a
federal district judge invalidated a Houston ordinance that prohibited the
operation of jitneys with a seating capacity of fewer than fifteen passen-
gers within city limits. 32' The court found that the "intended effect of the
ordinance'" which was enacted by referendum in 1924, "was to 'classify'
jitneys out of business" in order "to protect streetcar companies from
competition.
' 311
Like the anti-jitney laws enacted in the early decades of this century,
the restrictions that remain on the books today employ a variety of meth-
ods to "'classify' jitneys out of business"' 3 Many jurisdictions prohibit
jitneys altogether, either expressly32 or by implication."2 Jurisdictions
that fall into the latter category often prohibit private companies from
providing group passenger transportation services except in the most
limited circumstances, such as services operated by hotels, tour buses,
and airports . 26 Other jurisdictions permit limited "commuter van" or
"shuttle bus" services to operate, but reduce their attractiveness as a
commuting option by mandating that customers prearrange pick-up and
drop-off times, and by prohibiting the services from offering rides to in-
dividuals who hail them from the street. 3-7 The few jurisdictions that al-
319 Id.
370 See MINAm JITNEYS, supra note 250, at 1.
21 Santos v. City of Houston, 852 F. Supp. 601, 609 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that the
ordinance violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, and the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the federal Constitution).322 Id. at 603, 608.
33Id. at 608.324 E.g., KAN. CITY, Mo., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 76. art. 11. § 76-43 (1999) ("No
person shall drive, run or operate any jitney along or upon any street within the city at any
time.").
32 For example, some cities require all private transportation services to charge by
metered fare, effectively precluding the operation of jitneys carrying unrelated passengers.
See, e.g., BATON ROUGE, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 10, ch. 3, § 10:208 (2000). Others
simply do not provide for the authorization of jitney services. E.g., ATLAN A. GA., CODE
OF ORDINANCES ch. 162, art. II, § 31 (2000) ("The following classifications of vehicles for
hire are established: (1) Taxicabs; (2) Animal-drawn vehicles; (3) Limousines;
(4) Extended Limousines; (5) Vans; and (6) Sedans.').
326 See, e.g., supra note 325.327 See, e.g., N.Y., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 19-502(p) (1996); LANSING, MICH., CODIFIED
ORDINANCES ch. 872.01 (1999).
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low jitneys to exist legally generally require jitney providers to operate
along fixed, franchised routes or in specified zones.32 These restrictions
deprive jitneys of the flexibility that gives them much of their competitive
advantage by preventing jitneys from tailoring their services to meet the
needs of urban workers struggling to reach dispersed suburban jobs. 29
Other jurisdictions prohibit private transportation services from operating
on major thoroughfares, at least those that serve as public bus routes.330
Just as early anti-jitney legislation was designed to protect the reve-
nues of streetcar services, contemporary anti-jitney laws promote the
goal of shielding public transportation, especially public bus service,
from private competition. In addition to placing public bus routes off-
limits and otherwise restricting private services so as to eliminate any
competitive advantage, most jurisdictions require all new transportation
services to secure a "certificate of public convenience and necessity.'",
These requirements give public transportation authorities virtual veto-
power over any new entrant that poses a competitive threat.332 To secure
the required certificate, the applicant must prove the service is something
that the public as a whole needs and not something that only a portion of
it desires. 333 The applicant thus bears the burden of rebutting evidence,
usually submitted by existing public transportation providers who are
entitled to intervene in the proceedings, 334 that the existing providers not
only do not serve a public need, but also that they could not be made to
satisfy that need.
331
328 See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-112-480 (1997); HOUSTON, TEx., CODE
OF ORDINANCES § 46-354(a)-(e) (2000); L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 80.36.8 (1997).3
9See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-112-480 (1997); HOUSTON, TEX., CODE
OF ORDINANCES § 46-354(a)-(e) (2000); L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 80.36.8 (1997).
330E.g., DADE COUNTY, FLA., METRO. CODE ch. 31, § 103(g)(4) (2000); N.Y., N.Y.,
ADMIN. CODE § 19-529.1(a)(2) (1999).
331 William K. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity:
Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 426, 427-28 (1979); see also
13 Am. JUR. 2D Carriers § 125 (2000) ("In many states there are statutes which require
common carriers by motor vehicle to obtain a certificate declaring that the public conven-
ience and necessity require such operation."); CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-348-040
(1993); L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 71.12 (1996); 52 PA. CODE § 41.14 (1997); William B.
Tye, The Economics of Public Convenience and Necessity for Regulated Utilities, 60
TRANSP. PRAC. J. 143, 143 (1993) (stating that firms are protected from the threat of com-
petition in exchange for agreeing to comply with certain regulation constraints).332 See 52 PA. CODE § 41.12 (1996) ("The act provides the Commision with the discre-
tion to determine the amount of competition which best serves the public interest.").
33 See 13 AM. JUR. 2D Carriers § 130 (2000).
3
3 Jones, supra note 331, at 427.
335
A certificate should be granted only when the existing transportation facilities do
not, and cannot be made to, meet the demands of public convenience .... In a
proceeding to secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity for com-
mon carrier service by motor vehicle, the burden of showing the requisite public
convenience and necessity, the inadequacy of existing transportation facilities or
service, and that the applicant is a person of the character and responsibility to
[Vol. 38
Infonnal Transportation and the Urban Poor
The requirement that individuals seeking to enter the transportation
business first secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity is a
classic regulatory entry barrier.3 6 Its practical (and intended) effect is to
protect existing providers from competition. 3 7 One long-accepted justifi-
cation for the requirement is the need for regulatory authorities to pre-
vent "ruinous competition" among providers.338 As public choice theory
teaches, repeat players in the regulation game tend to "capture" the
regulators.3 39 "[The entrepreneur seeking entry generally must back his
judgment with substantial resources, whereas the regulatory body risks
nothing by denying entry and may indeed protect itself against trouble-
some problems of administration by protecting a familiar (if obsolete)
incumbent." " Thus, even the best efforts and most fervent arguments of
a would-be entrant tend to fall on deaf ears, regardless of their validity.
The laws restricting the operation of private van services in New
York City vividly illustrate the legal roadblocks facing would-be entre-
preneurs hoping to operate jitney services. In 1993, the state of New York
passed legislation authorizing New York City to assume responsibility
for regulating passenger van service within its boundaries.- ' The New
York City Council took advantage of the invitation and passed a local law
regulating van services . 2 Individuals must apply for authorization to
operate a "commuter van service" within city limits.Y The local law
defines a commuter van as "a commuter van service ... carrying passen-
gers for hire in the city duly licensed as a commuter van by the Commis-
sion and not permitted to accept hails from prospective passengers in the
street"34 and that may operate only "on a pre-arranged regular daily ba-
sis*'3  The law further prohibits commuter vans from picking up or dis-
charging passengers on any road used as a public bus route, barring ac-
cess to virtually every major street in the city.A
An applicant for this limited authorization to operate a "commuter
van service" bears the burden of proving that the proposed service "will
whom such certificate should be issued, is upon the applicant.
13 Am. JuR. 2D Carriers § 132 (2000) (citations omitted).
'33See Tye, supra note 331, at 143.
337See Jones, supra note 331, at 427 ("[Ihe essence of the certificate of public con-
venience and necessity is the exclusion of otherwise qualified applicants from a market:').
338 Ford P. Hall, Certificates of Convenience and Necessiy,, 28 Micn. L. REv. 107, 108
(1929); see also Jones, supra note 331, at 428.
-39 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 331, at 515.
34' Id.
34 N.Y. TRANs. L. § 80(5)(a) (McKinney 1993).
4
2 Court Decisions, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 24, 1999, at 27 (explaining provisions of Local
Law 115).
343 N.Y., N.Y, ADMN,. CODE § 19-504.2(a) (1993).
3 N.Y, N.Y., ADAmnN. CODE § 19-502(p) (1996).
-Id § 19-502(q).
w See id. § 19-529.1(a)(2).
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be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity."'
The law does not specify how an applicant might go about making such a
showing, but applicants generally collect statements from potential cus-
tomers indicating a need for their service."' The law provides opponents
of the service the opportunity to rebut an applicant's effort to make the
requisite "public convenience and necessity" showing. The city's De-
partment of Transportation must provide for public notice and comment
on the application as well as directly notify the New York Metropolitan
Transportation Authority when an application is filed.49 If an application
is "protested by a bus line operating in the city," the Department of
Transportation must also consider "the adequacy of the existing mass
transit and mass transportation facilities" and "the impact that the pro-
posed operation may have on any existing mass transit or mass transpor-
tation facilities.
350
This system vests absolute discretion in the regulatory authorities."'
The law neither provides guidance about how the Department of Trans-
portation should make the requisite "public convenience and necessity"
determination, 352 nor provides direction about how to evaluate the "ade-
quacy of existing mass transportation."35 3 In one case, an applicant sub-
mitted 938 support statements indicating that the proposed service was
desperately needed to augment inadequate bus service, yet the city coun-
cil never acted on the application.35 The authority charged with issuing
the license, the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, can
deny the application even if the Department of Transportation finds that
the service is necessary and that public transportation is inadequate.3'5
Alternatively, the law authorizes the Taxi and Limousine Commission to
refuse to act for 180 days, in which case the application is deemed de-
nied.356 City authorities are at no point required to provide a disappointed
47 Id. § 19-504.2(e)(1).
1 See, e.g., Aff. of Arthur V. Cummins, supra note 228, at 5.
39 N.Y., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 19-504.2(e)(3) (1993).
350 Id.
35 Technically, an unsuccessful applicant can ask a state court to review the city's de-
cision. N.Y. C.EL.R. art. 78 (McKinney 2000). Relief will be forthcoming, however, only
if the court finds that the local authority's decision to deny an application constituted an
abuse of discretion. The city is not required to provide any record explaining its decision,
making it virtually impossible for a disappointed applicant to make such a showing. If the
Taxi and Limousine Commission exercises its authority simply to do nothing, the court is
left with nothing to review.
352 N.Y., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 19-504.2(e)(1) (1993).
353 Id. § 19-504.2(e)(3)(a).
11 See Aff. of Arthur V. Cummins, supra note 228, at 5; Editorial, Thwarting a Van
Driver, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1997, at A26; Editorial, Let the Vans Roll, WALL ST. J., July
14, 1997, at A14. Under intense political pressure and facing a lawsuit by the disappointed
applicant, the city council struck a deal to authorize 40 vans. See Aff. of Arthur V. Cum-
mins, supra note 228, at 10.
155 See N.Y., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 19-504.2(e)-(f) (1993).
3-1 See id. § 19-504.2(f)(1).
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applicant with a record of their decision.35 Finally, until recently, the city
council had the power to veto any decision of the Taxi and Limousine
Commission to grant an application for a commuter van service21s
Since the city assumed regulatory responsibility in 1994, virtually
all applications for limited "commuter van service" licenses have been
denied.35 9 In some cases, the applicant successfully negotiated the ad-
ministrative process, convincing the New York City Department of
Transportation that the proposed service was "necessary" and that mass
transportation was "inadequate."'3 Under pressure from unions repre-
senting public transportation workers, however, the New York City
Council exercised its now-defunct authority to veto approval of the appli-
cation.361 The city has authorized approximately 300 commuter vans, -62
but most of these received their licenses from the State Department of
Transportation prior to 1994.
363
Even if the applicant is successful, securing authorization proves of
little value to individuals operating van services in New York City be-
cause the operating restrictions placed upon commuter van services pre-
vent them from legally providing the services their customers need and
demand.364 As a result, most authorized providers operate in clear dero-
gation of at least two of the limitations placed upon them: vans accept
street hails and pick up and discharge passengers on bus routes.'5 By
operating in this fashion, the dollar vans manage to stay afloat financially
and provide a valuable service. They also incite the wrath of public
transportation officials and their political allies, and expose themselves to
regular traffic citations and vehicle impoundments.
3 See id. § 19-504.2(0.
35s See id. § 19-504.2(0(3). A state trial judge recently invalidated this provision as
ultra vires; the decision is on appeal. See Giuliani v. Council of City of New York. 688
N.Y.S.2d 413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
359 See Aff. of Hector B. Ricketts, supra note 217, at 3.
360See Aff. of Arthur V. Cummins, supra note 228, at 5; Aff. of Hector B. Ricketts,
supra note 217, at 6.
361 See, e.g., Council on Road to an-dalism, supra note 218; Dream On, WALt.L ST. J.,
July 21, 1997, at A22 (discussing the city council's decision to "veto" Brooklyn Van Line's
application for authorization to operate 40 commuter vans).
36 VAN STUDY, supra note 213, at 3.
3 Aff. of Hector B. Ricketts, supra note 217, at 3. State law requires the city to reis-
sue "grandfathered" authorizations to these services. N.Y. TRA SP. LAwv § 80(5)(a)(1)(iii)
(McKinney 2000).
6' See Af. of Arthur V. Cummins, supra note 228, at 12-13 (discussing the restric-
tions and stating that "the current regulatory regime makes our service largely an outlaw
activity"); Aff. of Hector B. Ricketts, supra note 217, at 9-10 (same).
361 Supra note 228; Aft. of Arthur V. Cummins, supra note 228, at 12 ("The bus route
prohibition not only increases traffic in residential areas; it also makes it impossible to
provide the type of quality service that our passengers demand:'); Af. of Dennis Harry,
supra note 307, at 6 ("The rules not allowing us to pick up or drop off passengers on bus
routes are very difficult. Rockaway is a peninsula surrounded by the Bay and the ocean.
The only main street ... is a bus route. People do not like to go down ... the other streets
because it's so unsafe:').
366 One observer notes:
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V. A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR LEGAL REFORM
The notion that jitneys could fill in the gaps in public transportation
that currently impede welfare-reform efforts is consistent with policies
that many states promote, including policies that encourage welfare re-
cipients to become transportation providers-adopted with apparent dis-
regard for (or perhaps ignorance of) the laws that preclude such efforts?67
Of course, lawmakers should not abdicate responsibility for regulating
private passenger transportation services. Given concerns about passen-
ger safety, the government has a legitimate interest in regulating such
services. In light of the evidence that jitneys might provide the very type
of transportation service that inner-city residents desperately need, the
wisdom of keeping them off the streets is questionable.
My proposals for legal reform, therefore, are modest and straight-
forward. First, lawmakers should legalize jitney services by repealing
laws that prohibit or restrict them and enact in their place laws that are
more narrowly tailored to address legitimate public health and safety
concerns. Second, given the limitations inherent in even the best public
transportation systems, lawmakers should de-couple the regulation of
private transportation services from policies designed to preserve and
enhance public transportation. Jitneys should be viewed as a comple-
ment, not a threat, to public transportation.
A. Direct Impediments to Jitney Operations
Jitneys in New York and Miami manage to provide a valuable serv-
ice despite laws that essentially prohibit their operation. This situation,
however, is far from ideal from the perspective of either the jitney op-
erators or the public. The legislative prohibitions stifle the entrepreneu-
rial impulses of many would-be operators, keeping them off the streets
altogether and depriving residents of a needed service. Those who choose
to operate do so under the constant threat of legal sanction.3 6 Further-
more, van operators may have difficulty securing financing to purchase
new equipment or expand their service because investment in an illegal
business is viewed as risky by traditional sources of capital.
Legal restrictions that force jitneys into the underground economy
also hinder the government's ability to enforce legitimate health and
Van drivers face the constant prospect of being cited by the police, and their vans
seized, for providing the service that their customers demand. When this happens,
passengers are left stranded by the side of the road, and drivers and service own-
ers must spend a great deal of time and money defending against the charges.
Aff. of Hector B. Ricketts, supra note 217, at 11.
367 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 445.025(1) (2000).
3" See Aff. of Hector B. Ricketts, supra note 217, at 11.
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safety regulations. Illegal jitney services generally operate without ade-
quate liability insurance because a government-issued authorization is
often a prerequisite for policies covering vehicles for hire." Further-
more, because operators are subject to criminal sanctions simply by vir-
tue of the fact that they are on the street, they have little incentive to pro-
vide adequate driver training or, in some cases, to invest in safe and reli-
able vehicles. 70 Finally, laws prohibiting certain forms of service, such as
bans on accepting street hails, may lead drivers to operate recklessly'" to
avoid detection, sacrificing passenger safety to avoid criminal sanction.
Due to these safety concerns, lawmakers cannot responsibly enlist jitney
services in the welfare reform effort while legal restrictions prohibiting
their operation remain on the books.
These problems are fairly easily rectified. In recognition of the valu-
able service that jitneys could provide, especially for low-income work-
ers, lawmakers should legalize them.37 In some jurisdictions, this means
repealing laws that prohibit their operation altogether. In others, the law
must be amended to recognize jitneys as a legal form of transportation
service and provide for their authorization by the appropriate regulatory
authority. Alternatively, lawmakers could eliminate operating restrictions
that prevent existing forms of transportation services from legally pro-
viding the informal, flexible, unscheduled service that welfare recipients
need to get to work.373
In place of these restrictions, lawmakers should adopt and enforce
regulations that more directly address legitimate regulatory responsibili-
ties. Concerns about passenger safety, for example, can be addressed
through more narrow measures, including reasonable liability insurance
3 See, e.g., VAN STUDY, supra note 213, at 8-9 (discussing allegations that jitneys are
unsafe and uninsured).
370 Many of the operators in New York insist that concern for their passengers and their
reliance on the vans as their soul source of income lead them to invest in safe equipment.
See, e.g., Aff. of Dennis Harry, supra note 307, at 4, 5; Aff. of Hector B. Rickets, supra
note 217, at 5. For an explanation of why informal norms and community ties might lead
to such a result, see generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WiThoUT LAW 123-264 (1996).
371 Many commentators have criticized jitneys as being dangerous. See William Booth,
Miami's Jitney War: Entrepreneurs Drive Bus Riders Away, WASH. POST, July 29, 1992, at
A3; David Fleshier, Road Warriors; Jitneys Bob and Weave in Battle for Riders Against
Buses, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 29, 1998, at IB; For Safety's Sake. Encour-
age Legal Van Services, NEvSDAY, July 25, 1997, at A42; Mitchell Landsberg, LA.
Mounts Crackdown on Entrenched Bandit Taxis Safety: Thousands of Drivers Operate
Without Licenses, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2000, at Al; Garry Pierre-Pierre, Liven. Vans Are
Feeling the Metrocard Pinch; Drivers Say Their Business Is Down and the Competition Is
Up, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1999, at B1; Crash Sparks Fierce Debate, More Regulation for
Illegal Vans Backed, Stalled, N.Y. DAILY NEWs, Jan. 12, 1999, at 2.
m See, e.g., Sassen, supra note 19, at 2301-02 (arguing that "[from an economic per-
spective, criminalization makes no sense" in poor communities because "[the informal
economy is one of the few forms of economic growth evident in these communities").
: For a discussion of the impediments under existing legal forms of transportation.
see generally supra notes 64-130 and accompanying text.
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requirements, driver training courses, and regular vehicle inspections.314
Sweeping operating restrictions, such as prohibitions on operating along
major thoroughfares or accepting street hails, are not necessary to safe-
guard pedestrians or to maintain order on the public streets. These le-
gitimate concerns can be addressed by more narrow measures. Indeed, in
a recent book, scholars Daniel Klein, Adrian Moore, and Binyam Reja
set forth an innovative proposal for the orderly integration of private
transportation services such as jitneys. The authors advocate allocating
property rights to the curbs along public streets among various transpor-
tation providers.375 While this system of "curb rights" may prove more
attractive in theory than in practice, more modest measures, such as es-
tablishing "van stops" along major roads, would accomplish the same
goal.
B. Indirect Impediments to Jitney Operations
As the debate over jitneys in Miami and New York illustrates, many
of the laws prohibiting or restricting private group transportation services
are, like their earlier counterparts, motivated by the desire to protect
public transportation from private competition. In both New York and
Miami, for example, private transportation services are prohibited from
operating on major thoroughfares that serve as public bus routes.376 In
both cities, efforts to authorize additional van services or to liberalize
restrictions upon them are routinely defeated by deafening cries from
public transportation authorities, their employees, and their political al-
lies that the vans "steal" passengers from the public buses.377
Lawmakers should reconsider requirements that institutionalize a
presumption in favor of public transportation, especially laws imposing
374 In adopting such regulations, state and local regulators can draw important lessons
from the federal experience of deregulating the transportation industries. As a general
matter, the federal regulatory reform efforts have eliminated price and entry restrictions but
have maintained strict health and safety regulations. See generally Joseph D. Kearney &
Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1323, 1334-38 (1998) (describing deregulation of airlines, railroads, and trucking).
These regulations undoubtedly will increase the cost of operating jitney services. Some
potential entrepreneurs may be priced out of the market. On the other hand, legalizing
jitney services may open up previously unavailable sources of capital. Cf. Aff. of Hector B.
Ricketts, supra note 217, at 11 ("Because the grandfather authorizations are temporary and
are only valid through 2000, the value of our businesses and our investments have been
drastically reduced."). For example, money made available through "microloan" or "micro-
enterprise" programs, which provide low-interest loans to entrepreneurs who might not
otherwise qualify for credit, could help a willing operator get off the ground. See generally
LISA J. SERVON, BOOTSTRAP CAPITAL: MICROENTERPRISES AND THE AMERICAN POOR
(1999) (discussing microenterprise programs in the United States).
311 See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 308, at 107-13.
376 See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
377See, e.g., Booth, supra note 371; Willie James, Letter to the Editor, Commuter Vans
'Steal' Rides, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1997, at A19; William T. Kenney, Jr., Letter to the
Editor, Commuter Vans 'Steal'Riders, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1997, at A19.
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nebulous "public convenience and necessity" requirements. Rather than
letting the market determine whether the public "needs" a service that
has never before been available, these provisions require the applicant to
bear the onerous burden of rebutting the presumption that no need exists.
The applicant must challenge current providers of mass transportation
who, as repeat players, are more likely to have the ear of the regulator
making the public convenience and necessity decision.378 In the case of
jitneys, public convenience and necessity requirements inevitably give
public transportation authorities the opportunity to defeat an application
for operating authority either by showing that they can, theoretically,
satisfy the need identified or by demonstrating that the applicant's serv-
ice will create "ruinous competition" by stealing passengers from
them.379 Even if the public convenience and necessity hurdle were theo-
retically surmountable, the burden of satisfying it would be onerous for
the low-income entrepreneurs who would otherwise step forward to help
their neighbors. Experience in New York and Miami suggests that many
jitney operators are barely a step ahead financially of their low-income
and working-class customers.3r These "bootstraps capitalists" lack the
resources and sophistication necessary to rebut the evidence that their
well-financed opposition will inevitably amass against them in regulatory
proceedings. 38' Therefore, amending the law to recognize jitneys as a le-
gitimate form of transportation likely will prove an empty exercise so
long as public convenience and necessity requirements remain in place.
Eliminating the public convenience and necessity hurdle to authorization
is a necessary prerequisite to enlisting the very individuals who are most
familiar with their neighbors' transportation problems and thus most
likely to lend a helpful hand in the welfare reform effort. - 2
3 See supra notes 336-340.
37 See Hall, supra note 338, at 108 (citing "ruinous competition" justification for pub-
lic convenience and necessity requirements).
= See Af. of Dennis Harry, supra note 307, at 5 ("My drivers work hard. Before they
came to work for me, many of them were out of work, but they refused to go on unem-
ployment. They own their own vans:'); Aff. of Melvipher "Pat" Harvey, supra note 304, at
2 ("Before I started my van service I worked as a nurse's aide .... I saw that transporta-
tion services were inadequate where I worked .... Eventually, I decided that I could earn
money by helping to fill the transportation void. So I bought a van ... J'); Aff. of Hector
B. Ricketts, supra note 217, at 8 ("Van services like Queens Van Plan provide jobs for
workers who might otherwise lack employment. We provide opportunities for individuals
of modest means to become entrepreneurs and investors:'); see also Husock, supra note
208, at 62.
3 See Aff. of Arthur V. Cummins, supra note 228, at 3-10 (describing his nearly four-
year effort to obtain authorization); Aff. of Hector B. Ricketts, supra note 217, at 10 (dis-
cussing the Interborough Alliance of Community Transportation's futile efforts to help
operators obtain authorization).312 Eliminating these requirement would also be in line with recent legal developments
strongly favoring deregulation. See generally Kearney & Merrill, supra note 374 (discuss-
ing deregulation in railroads, airlines, trucks, telecommunications, electricity, and natural
gas).
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Traditionally, efforts to improve the transportation services available
to the urban poor have focused on providing additional public transpor-
tation.383 A complete discussion of the presumption in favor of public
transportation is far beyond the scope of this article. However, the dis-
cussion above illustrates that inherent limitations in traditional mass
transportation services likely make it impossible for public transportation
authorities to serve adequately the needs of many central-city residents.M
How lawmakers should respond to the potential competitive threat posed
by jitneys is an important public policy question. Stifling competition by
banning jitney services-which offer hope of filling in the gaps left by
even the best public transportation system-is not the best response. The
current system of regulation, which is heavily weighted in favor of the
status quo, makes no sense when the status quo has proven so ill-
equipped to address the transportation needs of the urban poor. A more
appropriate response to jitneys' competitive threat would be to adopt
policies that support and encourage both types of services.3"5
VI. CONCLUSION
When the government enters into a contract with a van service, at
least some limited number of welfare recipients will be guaranteed a ride
to work. The same cannot be said for the decision to liberalize restric-
tions on jitney services. The experience of Miami and New York suggests
that, if permitted to operate, jitneys can contribute invaluably and perma-
nently to efforts to improve the economic prospects of America's inner-
city residents. Of course, in some cities, jitneys may be a total flop. Per-
haps their remarkable success in New York and Miami is attributable to
the presence of large numbers of immigrants accustomed to relying on
383 See generally JUST TRANSPORTATION: DISMANTLING RACE AND CLASS BARRIERS TO
MOBILITY (Robert D. Bullard & Glenn S. Johnson eds., 1997) (calling for additional public
transportation services in poor minority neighborhoods); Anne Simmons, A Ride to Work:
TEA-21 and PRWORA, 18 LAW & INEQ. 243 (2000) (arguing that increasing public trans-
portation should be a welfare-reform requirement).
384 See Farkas, supra note 63, at 88-92 (discussing limitations of public transportation
in Baltimore and advocating that the government reduce regulations that inhibit the private
sector from operating complementary transportation services).
31 One possibility would be to support public transportation through increased public
subsidies, if necessary. See Jones, supra note 331, at 509. If history has any predictive
value, public transportation has little to fear from competition. All evidence indicates that
substantial public investment in public transportation will continue even if competition by
private jitney services were to undercut ridership substantially. Since 1964, Congress has
spent nearly $200 billion subsidizing mass transportation projects. See Walters, supra note
313. During this same time, public transportation costs per vehicle mile increased, while
ridership declined precipitously. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 308, at 12. In 1992, there
were, on average, 9.3 passengers per bus (with a capacity of 70); this figure includes rush
hour traffic. See id. at 12. "Off-peak buses run virtually empty." Id. at 12. Between 1960
and 1992, the ratio of earnings (from passenger fares) to operating costs fell from 1.03 to
0.37; approximately 70% of the operating budgets of public transportation systems now
come from taxpayers. Id. at 13.
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jitneys to serve their transportation needs.-86 However, the question for
legislators ought not to be whether jitneys will in fact successfully aug-
ment the transportation services available to our poorest citizens. Rather,
the question should be whether it makes sense to maintain legal restric-
tions that hinder the development of transportation services that hold so
much promise of improving the economic prospects of the very poor.
3See, e.g., Sassen, supra note 19, at 2290 (suggesting that immigration may play a
large role in the "informalization" of economic activities in advanced capitalist countries).
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